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Preface 
In the past ten years, much work has been done to add more structure to database models 1 than 
what is represented by a mere collection of flat relations (Albano & Cardelli [1985], Albano et 
a!. [1986], Borgida eta. [1984], Brodie [1984], Brodie & Ridjanovic [1984], Brodie & Silva 
[1982], Codd [1979], Hammer & McLeod [1981], King [1984], King & McLeod [1984], [1985], 
Mylopoulos et al. [1980], Smith & Smith 1977a & b). 2 The informal approach which most of 
these studies advocate has a number of disadvantages. First, a recent survey of some of the pro-
posed models by Urban & Delcambre [1986] reveals a wide divergence in terminology and con-
cepts, making comparison of the expressive power of these models difficult. Second, undefined 
or even ill-defined concepts are a hindrance, not an aid, for the analysis of the Universe of 
Discourse (UoD). Third, informal treatment 9f such complex structures as set hierarchies, gen-
eralization hierarchies and aggregation hierarchies all in one model, with some dynamics thrown 
in for good measure, bodes ill for the consistency of these theories. 
The first goal of the research reported on is to integrate the static structures which these 
models propose in one coherent, axiomatic framework. It will be shown in chapter 7 that the 
theory presented here provides the needed conceptual foundations for these models. A second 
aim is to provide a possible worlds framework onto which to graft theories of the dynamics of 
the UoD. The third aim is to provide clear concepts which can aid the database model designer 
in his or her thinking about the UoD. In this report we concentrate on the first goal only, leav-
ing the formulation of theories of domain dynamics and the application to system development 
as research goals for the near future. 
The structure of this report is as follows. 
Chapter 1 provides the necessary context for the theory by defining a four level structure 
for information systems (IS's). The goal of this and of forthcoming reports can then be stated 
in terms of this IS structure. 
Chapter 2 formalizes the concept of object by combining ideas from database theory (sur-
rogates and identities), philosophical logic (identity and rigid designation), axiomatic set theory 
(the hierarchy of sets) and systems theory (state spaces and state transition functions). 
Chapter 3 defines attributes and introduces an example database domain. It also draws an 
important distinction between attributes and operations. 
I. This is one of the three meanings in which "model" is used, the other two being that of abstraction and 
of model for a formal language. See section 7.2 for an explication of these three meanings. 
2. In the literature, the term "semantic model" is often used to indicate a model which has one or more of 
structures like generalization and aggregation and grouping. It is not clear to me why the possesion of one or 
more of these structures makes a model more semantic than others. In whatever sense the word "model" is 
used, a model has semantics, i.e. it has an intuitive meaning or it serves as an interpretation structure for a 
formal language. A related misnomer is the term "conceptual model" for such models, for there is no model 
which is not conceptual. Borgida et al. [1984] motivate the term "conceptual model" by saying that "such a 
model consists of symbol structures and symbol structure manipulators which, according to a rather naive 
mentalistic philosophy, are supposed to correspond to the conceptualizations of the world by human ob-
servers" (p. 89). Given the fact that human beings often have quite mistaken ideas about what is going on 
around them, trying to represent these ideas cannot be the goal of the development of an DB. Rather, the 
DB is built. among other reasons, so that human beings can form ideas about the multitude of events occur-
ring around them which deviate less from the truth than would have been the case without the aid of an DB. 
Chapter 4 investigates the lattice structure of the specialization/ generalization hierarchy. 
The concepts of kind and type are defined, and criteria are given for a kind (type) to be 
natural. 
The results of chapters 2-4 are distilled in a number of axioms about the UoD, some of 
which are common to all UoD's and others which are specific to individual UoD's. For the 
example UoD, these a xioms are summarized in appendix 3. Appendix 4 gives a formal model 
for these axioms. 
Chapter 5 defines the concepts of state and combines it with the concept of identity to 
define objects. A possible world is then defined as a function which assigns one state to each 
different object identity. Different possible definitions of object existence are discussed. 
Chapter 6 treats the set of possible worlds as a set of possible models for static integrity 
constraints. Worlds which satisfy the static constraints are called admissible. 
Chapter 7 uses the conceptual apparatus develGped in chapter 2-6 to analyze the structures 
of "semantic" data models like TAXIS, RM/T, SDM and others. Two other models which 
stand in the relational tradition, the universal relation model and several proposals for non-
first-normal-form models, are investigated as well. Also, a brief comparison with some prob-
lems and their solutions in philosophical logic, relevant to the specification of data models, is 
given. 
Chapter 8, finally, summarizes the main results and lists topics for future research. 
The appendices contain a list of notational conventions, an overview of ZF, a summary of 
the axioms for the example UoD used in this report and a description of a formal model for 
these axioms. 
Thanks are due to Jan Will em Klop, Reind van de Riet and Hans Weigand for their care-
ful reading of different versions of this report. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. The universe of discourse and the domain 
1.1.1. 
In Griethuysen [1982], the Universe of Discourse (UoD) of an IS is defined in two different 
ways as 
1. "those things and happenings to which the common understanding of the represented infor-
mation refers" (p. 1-2) and 
2. "The collection of all objects (entities) that ever have been, are, or ever will be in a 
selected portion of a real world or postulated world of interest that is being described." (p. 
1-4) 
These definitions are different because 1 can be taken to refer to past, present and future actual 
and possible entities, whereas 2 only refers to past, present and future actual entities. In this 
report we follow the first definition and define the UoD as follows. 
The UoD is the collection of entities which are, have been, or will be actu-
ally or possibly of interest. 
There are two important elements in this definition, viz. the references to 1. interestingness and 
to 2. actual as well as possible entities in the UoD. We discuss the first aspect in the rest of this 
section. The second aspect is subject of the rest of this report. 
1.1.2. 
The consequences of the statement that the UoD consists of entities of interest can be summar-
ized under five headings. 
1. The UoD is a social world. (At least the UoD's we are interested in.) It presupposes a 
being for whom there are entities of interest. In philosophical terms, the UoD presup-
poses an intentional being, i.e. a being who can direct his or her attention to an (abstract 
of concrete) entity and for whom the entity is of interest ("intentional" is here used with a 
meaning different from "intending" in everyday language). Many UoD entities only exist 
by virtue of the intentionality of human beings. For example, bank accounts, orders, 
financial obligations, letters of intents, etc. are entities which exist because people attach 
meaning to them. They are social entities (see Lehtinen & Lyytinen [1986] for an analysis 
of IS's as formal_mechanisms for the representation of intentional entities, based upon the 
work of Searle [1969] and Searle & Vanderveken [1985]). If we remove the people from 
the UoD, intentional entities like bank accounts, obligations etc. disappear as well. 
2. The perception of the UoD often is part of the UoD. This property of the social world is 
argued in Searle [1984] and is actually implicit in the above point. The common under-
standing of a bank account is part of the universe of bank accounts. It must be stressed 
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that a social world is a world of intentional beings and vice versa. 
3. The perceptions of the UoD differ. The initial stages of information analysis typically con-
sist of talking to people living in the UoD and reading documents describing the UoD. 
Virtually no source of information about the UoD gives the same description of what the 
UoD is. One may wonder if, indeed, there is "a" UoD. (Kent [1980] gives numerous 
illustrations of differences in views of the UoD and the problems encountered in formaliz-
ing the UoD.) On the one hand, people living in the UoD have different ideas about what 
the reality is they live in but on the other hand, they manage to talk to each other, which 
presupposes a common reality. 3 
4. Conflicts exist at any (un)desirable metalevel. The analise typically uncovers political, 
psychological, sociological and economical tensions which must be considered to be part of 
the UoD as well. Different views of the UoD lead to conflicts, but reflecting on these con-
flicts, different participants in the conflicts have different views of what these conflicts are 
about, where they come from, how they should be resolved, etc. 
5. The introduction of the IS changes the UoD. I behave differently if I know my working 
time is registered. Instead of going to the post-office on the way to work, I will go to 
work first, register, and then go to the post-office. Registration is the basic function of 
any IS. Registration can be perfected to such a large extent that it becomes permanent 
observation (by video monitors-, electronic identification cards etc.), and it is a known fact 
from social science that permanent observation fundamentally changes the nature of human 
behavior. In particular, it tends to diminish the play-like, creative aspects of human 
behavior. 
We can divide system development into roughly two parts, the analysis of the UoD and the 
design of an automized IS. Human intentionality is the source of all complexity in the first 
halve of system development, the analysis of the UoD (machine unwieldiness being the source 
of all headaches in the second halve). The means to attack this complexity lie in the very 
source of the problem: Intentionality itself. The system analise is an intentional being as well 
who, in principle, is capable of understanding what is going on and who has (or ought to 
have) the linguistic capability to verbalize it. This explication process moves in a circle running 
from a grasp of the whole of the UoD to a grasp of the details and back again. In philosophy 
and linguistics this is known as the hermeneutical circle, after the problem of understanding a 
difficult text from a foreign culture far removed from the reader in time and space. Under-
standing of the parts of the text presuppose understanding of the whole and vice versa (see also 
Winograd & Flores [1986]). It is in this intentional context that we explicate the junctions of 
the IS. Again, understanding of the part of the UoD to be modelled by the IS presupposes an 
idea of the functions which the IS is to fulfil, but those functions can only be understood in 
terms of the part of the UoD ~o be modelled. 
3. This suggests that philosophical idealism (the world exists in our minds only) and realism (our abstract 
concepts refer to real entities) are only two halves of a truth. Philosophical idealism is a station long past in 
the history of philosophy, but seems to be an easy refuge for mathemattcally oriented systems analysts for 
whom everything is relative and the UoD is what the customer thinks it is. 
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1.1.3. 
I make the drastic move to abstract from all problems related to intentionality, both in the UoD 
itself as well as in the first ·halve of system development. This is done by defining the domain 
of an IS as an abstraction of the UoD in which at least all intentionality has been removed. 
The domain is the collection of all objects which are, have been, or will be 
actual or possible. 
The domain can be viewed as the explicit description of the relevant aspects of the UoD which 
is the output of the first stage of information analysis and the input to the second stage, design-
ing an (usually automated) IS in a finite medium. At the domain level of abstraction, all con-
flicts have been resolved (or, more likely, eliminated, ignored, or suppressed). The domain is 
Nagel's [1986] "view from nowhere". By placing it at the interface between the informal and 
formal stages if system development, we recognize that both stages deal with a real part of the 
world. 4 
The domain may also be construed as the UoD as viewed by a disinterested all-knowing 
Observer with infinite computational power. This is the universe under the eye of Eternity, the 
machine which 17th-century philosophers thought the world to be. In this Platonic heaven, all 
objects exist for all eternity (this will be formalized below). Existence of the objects in the 
domain independent of any human observer is the hallmark of Platonism (Bernays [1935]). 
1.1.4. 
To aid intuition in reading the following chapters, I already sketch the domain structure in an 
informal manner. The domain is a directed graph in which the nodes are possible worlds and 
the arcs are transitions between possible worlds. Each possible world may be thought of as a 
domain state. Alternatively, the set PW of possible worlds may be viewed as a state space. 
The arcs in the directed graph of possible worlds then represent a state transition function. 
There is one trajectory through the state space which is represents the actual life of the UoD. I 
do not distinguish a current domain state. The Observer has infinite knowledge of the domain 
and posseses a description of the complete graph. 
Each possible world is a set of objects which are called actual in that world. Each object 
is a pair (identity, state). The identity of an object is immutable and persists through change. 
It is also unique across possible worlds and thus ~erves to identify an object uniquely, indepen-
dently of its state. The state of an object is a tuple of object identities. For example, to 
represent a UoD entity named John with address 17, Fleet Street, we may have 
This is a domain object with identity p 1 and state vector (John, a 1). John is the identity of 
only one object, (John, ()) and a 1 identifies the object 
4. Programmers (and not programmers alone) tend to think that what is not formalizable, explicitly describ-
able, does not exist. Nagel calls this the ~epistemological criterion for reality"' and points out that it is a rem-
nant of (philosophical) idealism. 
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(a 1, ( 17, Fleet Street)). 
The two components of this state vector identify the objects ( 17, ()) and (Fleet Street, ()). 
Objects are thus aggregated out of other objects, and, going downward, the aggregation stops at 
identities like 17 and John, which may be called atoms. Atoms have a zero-length state vector. 
They have no internal state and may be considered to be equal to the (only) object they iden-
tify. 
All of this will be treated in greater detail below. 
1.2. An extension of the four-level architecture 
1.2.1. 
Several researchers, among whom Kent [1980], have propostd a four-level architecture for IS's. 
Between the function level (the "external schema") and the implementation level (the "internal 
schema"), Kent proposes to insert two levels, called the enterprise and the collective level. The 
enterprise level describes the UoD, whereas the collective level is an implementation-
independent description of the DB shared by all application programs (hence "collective"). We 
adopt this approach but change the usual representation of the architecture for two reasons. 
First, we want to account for the fact that a computer is essentially. a simulation device. The 
reason why a universal Turing machine is a good abstraction from a computer is that the UTM 
possesses the essential property of a computer in bare form, viz. that it is universal, or, in other 
words, that it can simulate any machine. I described the domain as an infinite world machine. 
It is the job of a finite computer to simulate the domain as well as it can. 
The second reason for changing the representation of the four-level architecture is that we 
want to show that the user, as part of the UoD, looks at the UoD when he or she interrogates 
the DB. Abstracting from differences in opinion between users, the user looks at the domain 
but gets answers from the DB. We thus get the picture of figure 1. The UoD is actually a 
number of UoD views of people who participate in the UoD. The dots around the UoD suggest 
that the UoD is, in general, the place of ambiguous and informal processes. 
After system analysis, the UoD is abstracted into an unambiguous domain in terms of 
which a number of user domain views are defined. The domain and its views are explicitly 
described, whereas the UoD isn't. 5 The solid lines around the domain and other parts of figure 
1 represent the fact that these are explicitly described. The arrows from the UoD to the domain 
suggest that the UoD can be explicated in different ways to a domain. 
The database 6 is a finite representation of the domain and the database views finitely 
represent the domain views. The transition from the domain to the database is a reduction, for 
the domain is, in general, infinite, whereas the DB is always finite. The arrows from the 
5. And, I argue in Wieringa [1987], can't. 
6. I use the terms "data" and "database" instead of the more ambituous "information base" or even 
"knowledge base ... Whether the data in the DB convey information about the UoD or contain knowledge 
about the UoD, is outside the scope of the formalism. It depends upon the informal context of the use of the 
description, i.e. among other things upon the quality of the abstracti<'n which the domam is. and upon a host 
of other things, such as the existing knowledge of the user and the relation between the DB and the domain. 
' I 
I 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
' 
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domain to the DB represent the fact that one DB state does not unambiguously represent one 
state of one domain. Each DB state is compatible with states of different domains (so that there 
is, in general, room for difference in opinion about the meaning of the result of a DB query). 
Even if the DB were unambiguously compatible with only one domain, each DB state will in 
general represent many domain states. 
The DB and its views are simulated by an implementation m which actual hard- and 
software have been chosen to do the job. 
1.2.2. 
Kent's four-level architecture appears in figure 1 as the implementation ("internal schema"), 
database, ("collective schema"), domain, ("enterprise schema"), and database views, ( "exter-
nal schemas"). The extension of the four-level approach thus consists of the addition of domain 
views and a more precise definition of the relation between UoD and domain and between 
domain and DB. 
The domain corresponds roughly with what is called a "conceptual model" or "semantic 
model" in systems like TAXIS, SDM and others. My criticism of those models can now be 
rephrased as follows. 
1. They do not provide concepts which are clear enough to help m the abstraction from the 
UoD. 
2. They use different, incompatible, undefined or even ill-defined concepts to describe 
domain structures. 
3. They do not provide formal tools to guarantee that the domain specification is consistent. 
To this a fourth critique can be added, 
4. They do not provide the conceptual tools to explicate the decisions which must be made to 
reduce an infinite domain to a finite database. 
The subject of this report is the static structures found in the domain. Its goal is to axiomatize 
stat1c domain structures and provide foundations for other approaches to static domain struc-
tures. Forthcoming reports will add dynamic structures, apply these to a non-trivial task of 
UoD abstraction, and study the issues of domain reduction. 
2 .1. Identities as surrogates 
2.1.1. 
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Chapter 2 
Object identity 
The identity of a domain object (s, a) is a surrogate for the identity of a UoD entity. Hall et 
al. [1976] cite Langefors [1966] as saying that a UoD entity "may be regarded as being a simple 
bundle of property values associated with it." 7 This view has several problems, notably that the 
set of values stored for an object may not identify it uniquely. This forces us to introduce an 
artificial property, the key of the object, which is unique for all domain objects. A key is thus 
what in logic is called a uniquely identifying description of domain objects. However, with keys 
as with uniquely identifying descriptions, a number of problems remain. A key may cease to be 
uniquely identifying, or there may be different keys used by different people, or a key may be 
changed. For example, a unique personel number may be replaced by another unique personel 
number, and this replacement is indistinguishable from the dismissal of an employee and the 
hiring of another one with the same non-key properties and a new personel number. Hall et al. 
therefore introduce the concept of surrogate as the unique representative in the IS of a UoD 
entity. The surrogate of an UoD entity is a system-generated, unchangeable bearer of proper-
ties. By contrast, any combination of one or more properties borne by the surrogate may be 
used as a key. 
In terms of domains, the identity of a domain object is an abstraction of the identity of a 
UoD entity and bears properties which are in their turn abstractions of identities of UoD enti-
ties. Conversely, the identity of a domain object represents the identity of a UoD entity, and its 
properties represent properties of the UoD entity. Specifically, a surrogate represents the fol-
lowing information about a U oD entity: 
1. that the entity exists actually or possibly in the past, present or future of the UoD, 
2. that it is different from other entities in the UoD and 
3. that it persists through time. 8 
7. On the surface, this is close to the Buddhist standpoint that things are just bundles of momentaneous pro-
penies which join together and fall apan again in each instant and have no identity over and above there tem-
porary association. It is also close to Hume's standpoint that we form ideas of things by habitually forming 
associations of elementary impressions. Closer investigations, though, reveals more differences than paral-
lels. See E. Conze, "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy" in Conze, Buddhist Studies 1934-1972, 
Wheelwright Press, n.d., 229-242 and "Buddhist Philosophy and its European Parallels," ibid. 210-228. 
8. These are the three characteristics of what the Buddhists call avidya, common sense knowledge which en-
ables us to get by in the everyday world. A vidya is usually translated as "ignorance." It is contrasted with 
prajna (translated as "intuition"), which is pre-reflexive awareness of the unsubstantial and fleeting nature 
of this world. Prajna makes us realize the relativity of the three statements concerning surrogates (we don "t 
even negate them). To be precise, using our prajna we see that I. it is wrong to say that a thing exists 
through time seperately from other things, 2. that it is wrong to deny this fact, 3. that it is wrong to both af-
firm and deny it and 4. that it is wrong to neither affirm or deny it. In other words, using our prajna, we 
see that entities have no identity. The absolute truth seen in prajna is unutterable, unteachable, etc. (T.V. 
Muni, The essential philosophy of Buddhism, p. 239 ff.). Cleurly. it is the avidya of the domain we want to 
represent in a knowledge base. 
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2.1.2. 
There is some conceptual clarification to be done concerning the status of abstract entities like 
numbers, strings, or Boolean values. Having so carefully distinguished the domain from the 
UoD, I must now note that numbers -assuming that they exist- exist in the UoD. But as abstract 
entities they exist in the domain as well. One wonders if numbers would exist if people 
wouldn't, or if the existence of numbers presupposes the existence of an infinite Observer in 
Whose mind numbers (and we) exist as a cosmic dream (Berkeley). These problems won't 
bother us at all in this report. But this brief remark does show, in my opinion, that database 
. modelling is close to the "world knot" ( Schopenhauer). 
2.1.3. 
The advantages of the use of surrogates in IS's have been discussed, among vthers, by Atkinson 
et al. [1983], Codd [1979], Date [1983], Hallet al. [1976], Kent [1979].and Khoshafian & Cope-
land [1986]. We summarize them below, where we distinguish the advantages for use in the 
domain and its views, in the database and its views, and in the implementation. Most advan-
tages follow from the independence of identity from the state of the object. 
1. In the domain, we have identity through domain change. This makes it possible to give 
meaning to the phrase "same object" even if all attribute values have changed. In particu-
lar, keys may be changed, e.g. when the domain is reorganized. 
2. In domain views, we have identity under different views of the domain. It makes it possi-
ble to speak of the same entity even when two totally different descriptions of the entity 
are offered. For example, different departments in an organization may use different 
keys, or before and after an organization different keying schemes are used. 
It is by these two advantages that we are able to use surrogate names as rigid designators for 
objects, i.e. as names which refer to the same object in every possible domain state ( cf. Kripke 
[1971], [1980]). 
3. The use of surrogates in the database has advantages which follow from the fact that iden-
tity is independent of the spatial or temporal organization of the DB. The points below 
parallel the advantages for use in the domain in that they concern identity (spatial unique-
ness) and change (temporal persistence). 
3.1. Persistence. The information that a domain object exists survives database transac-
tions. This facilitates a uniform treatment of stored and derived information. 
Derived information concerns persistent entities, but happens to be computed by the 
implementation every time it is needed. 
3.2. No duplications. The information that domain object exists is represented once. 
Referential integrity constraints are built into the notation introduced below. 
3.3. Indistinguishable objects. Two objects may be allowed to be different even when 
they agree on all attribute values represented in the database. This is not allowed in 
relational databases, where all tuples in a table must differ in at least one attribute 
value. 
4. For database views, the advantages follow from the fact that all information about an 
object is attached to a "ingle identity. 
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4 .1. Thus, the entity join (Kent [1979]) is built into the domain. All information about a 
domain object is represented in a single state vector which is attached to the identity 
of the object. There is no need for the user to join tuples from different relation 
instances together in order to get information about a single object. 
4.2. Moreover, the use of surrogates allows queries to be expressed as path-expressions 
which are simpler than the corresponding queries in a relational language using kyes 
to identify information about a single object in different relation instances 
(Khoshafian & Copeland [1986]). 
5. In the implementation, surrogates are roughly global record identifiers in virtual address 
space. This allows the separation of identity from addressability. Independence of object 
identity from from location in virtual and hence physical address space facilitates sharing 
of objects among different programs. In appendix 4 a model of the formal theory of the 
domain is given which is isomorphic to IN . The set of natural numbers in this model serve 
as global identifiers in an infinite DB. 
2.1.4. 
It is worth dwelling at some length on these advantages, for surrogates carry disadvantages as 
well. Two phenomena of domain dynamics seem to call for an adaption of the idea that a sur-
rogate is the identity of a single object in all possible domain states. 
1. Merging. Two entities may merge into one. For example, part-time jobs, budgets, com-
mittees, projects etc. may be merged. What happens with their identity during the merge? 
2. Splitting. The converse problem, of course, is the splitting of one entity into s_everal. 
Codd [1979] proposes a coalesce operator which merges surrogates. Before such operators are 
contemplated, less exotic forms of change should be tackled. For example, in the presence of 
these two phenomena, the principle of the substitutivity of identicals is violated (Hintikka 
[1969]). 
A number of other problems with surrogates have been mentioned in the literature (e.g. 
Reiter [1984] and Levesque [1984]). These all have to do with the occurrence of noise in the 
communication channel from the domain to the DB or with the finiteness of the DB. We can 
distinguish the following problems. 
1. Disjunctive information. An attribute value may be one out of a group of surrogates, but 
we do not know which because this information has been lost in the communication from 
the domain to the DB. For example, a color may be either red or brown (but not both). 
2. Conjunctive information. The converse problem is that the message arrives at the DB 
undistorted, but the DB cannot be in sufficiently many different states to represent the 
information. For example, a color may be red-brown, but the DB only disposes of the 
attribute values red and brown. Both values are equally right (or wrong). Consequently, 
the value red in the DB represents red and red-brown in the domain, and similarly for 
brown. The problem can be solved by using two values, (red, brown), which in conjunc-
tion represent a single domain value. This must be distinguished, of course, from the case 
where only one of the two DB values is correct, and from the case where there are 
genuinely two different domain objects to be represented (e.g. a project consisting of two 
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members). 
3. Errors. Even if the discriminating ability is sufficient, there may be errors. For example, 
two DB surrogates may turn out to represent the same DB object, or one may represent 
two objects, or one DB surrogate may represent the wrong domain object. 
2.1.5. 
Having relativized the surrogate concept somewhat, we note that none of the problems men-
tioned so far have been solved satisfactorily, let alone that a single solution to all of them is 
known. Because the surrogate idea is particularly suited to dealing with identity through 
change, I will follow up the idea to see how far I can get with it. 
The upshot of this section is that we have a set S of surrogates for the identity of all possi-
ble UoD entities. We declare the concept of identity of a UoD entity understood (see Kripke 
[1971], [1980]) and assume that it is applicable to the relevant entities in the UoD. To distin-
guish the theory developed in this report from other theories (relational, object-oriented) I call 
it the ABSURD model, for ABstract SURrogate Domain. 
2.2. Identities as sets 
2.2.1. 
Since Makinouchi [1977] the need for non-atomic attribute values has been recognized in the 
relational DB community. For example, project members, several copies of the same book in a 
library, the children in a family are real-world entities which are naturally represented in the 
domain by sets. A number of researchers have studied the integration of set-valued attributes in 
the relational model, in an object-oriented model or in a logic programming framework (see 
section 7.3 for references and a discussion). A domain object has the form 
where s i E S, i = 0, ... , n. If we allow sets as attribute values, then any s E S may be a set. 
So we ought to allow sets as object identities as well. For example, in the ubiquitous project-
employee UoD, we may be interested in employees as well as sets of employees. Then in the 
abstract domain representing this UoD, we may have a surrogate s0 which represents (the iden-
tity of) a set of employees whose identities are represented by s 1, ..• , s n . The s 0 is the same set 
as {s 2 , ..• , sn}, 
so= {sz, ... ,sn}. 
The = is equality of sets, defined in axiomatic set theory. 
Now, which surrrw1tes are sets of which other surrogates? The Observer knows, but we 
don't. The easiest way to think of S is to see it as a subset of the class V of all possible sets. 
The precise structure of V depends upon the particular axiomatization of set theory one works 
in. Nothing is assumed aboul V, except that all its elements are sets. Now, if S~ V, then any 
s E S is a set. There are three cases: 
1. s ~ S. We are interested in the elements of s. so they are identities of domain objects. 
An example is the set of employees above. Surrogates of this type may be called, 
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misleadingly, set surrogates. 
2. s n S = 0 . We are interested in no element of s. An example is a surrogate in an agri-
cultural domain representing a crop growing on a field in a particular period of time. The 
crop is a set of individual plants, but in the domain we represent only the identity of the 
whole crop, not of its elements. Surrogates of this type are at the bottom of the set hierar-
chy inS and play the role of Urrelemente, primitive elements, in the domain. 
3. If neither 1 nor 2 is the case, we may speak of set surrogates as well. An example is the 
representation of a printing of a book in a library domain. The library may posses several 
copies of the book of the same printing. The printing is represented in the library domain 
as a set, and a few of its elements are represented in the domain as well. 
Note that we now distinguish two hierarchies, each with its basic elements. The smallest ele-
ments in the aggregation hierarchy are called atoms, the smallest elements in the set hierarchy 
are called primitive elements. 
2.2.2. 
Before these ideas are formalized, I want to point out the usefulness of this view of surrogates 
and object identity. First, we can in the formal language defined below meaningfully apply the 
binary predicate E (in infix notation) to surrigates: 
s 1 E s 2 
1s either true of false in an interpretation of this language. This simplifies the description of 
the domain greatly. 
Second, wildly varying UoD structures can be represented by domain objects in a concise, 
uniform manner. The orthogoilal classifications of primitive versus non-primitive surrogates 
and atomic versus non-atomic surrogates gives rise to the following four possibilities. 
1. (s 0 , ()) with s 0 a primitive, atomic surrogate. For example, (John, ()). 
2. (s 0 , ()) with s 0 a non-primitive, atomic surrogate. For example, the set of employees on a 
project is ( {s 1, ... , s n }, ()) (assuming that we don't find any attributes of this set relevent 
enough to represent in the domain. 
3. (s 0 , (s 1, ... , sn)) with s 0 a primitive, non-atomic surrogate. This IS the traditional struc-
ture for domain objects. For example, (s 0 , (12, John)). 
4. (s 0 , (s 1, ... , sn)) with s 0 a non-primitive, non-atomic surrogate. For example, 
({sl, ... , sn},Csn+l• sn+2)) where {s .... , sn} is a set of identities of employees and 
(s n + 1, s n +Z) is a pair (average -age, average -salary). (There are obvious integrity 
constraints on these attribute values and attribute values of the employees in the set. 
Integrity constraints are treated in chapter 6.) 
Compare this with the objects of ~hoshafian & Copeland [1986], which have the form 
(identifier, type, value), where type can be one of atom, set, and tuple . Because in my model 
identifier can be a set and a tuple is a tuple of identifiers. T can drop the type and let value be 
of tuple -type only. The bonus is a simpler object structure and a more powerful expressiveness. 
Objects are basically systems with a state space and an identity so that we can keep isomorphic 
systems apart. (In a forthcoming report I introduce a state transition function for objects.) Case 
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4 above, which has been called a "metaclass" m some modelling approaches, cannot be 
represented by Khoshafian & Copeland. 
As will be shown in section 7 .4, the use of axiomatic set theory allows one to clear up a 
conceptual muddle surrounding "metaclasses", "associations" and "higher-order classes" in 
some "semantic" data models. 
2.3. Domain axiomatizations 
2.3.1. 
I now formalize the foregoing ideas by introducing a formal language L s to describe the static 
structure of the domain. Figure 2 shows the different levels of abstraction involved in the for-
malization. 
s S. 
I 
PWG 
Figure 2. 
L 
s 
~in te rpretati on 
v 
I 
I 
I 
abstraction ,1 
representation 
, .... -., 
I .... 
I ' 
. ' I \ 
UoD \ l 
\ 
I 
I 
' J 
' I 
' I 
', .... --~./ 
The domain is formalized as a directed graph PWG of possible worlds. PWG is an abstraction 
of the UoD and represents the UoD in an abstract world. PWG is a sunset of the class V of all 
sets, as is S. The elements of S are named by s 1 . S and s 1 are introduced below as constants 
of a set-theoretical language. Other constants will be introduced as well. PWG is a defined 
term, formally part of the metalanguage in which we talk about L 5 but practically a constant in 
Ls. 
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2.3.2. Definition 
A static domain language L 5 ( CON) is a first-order language using the following symbols. 
1 . Individual variables: 
There are infinitely many variables. I do not actually give the names of the individual 
variables. 
2. A set CON of constants: 
CON = CON A U CON NK U {NA , A , NK, em, s} with 
ext E CONA, 
Ext E CONNK• 
s E CONNK· 
The meaning of the special constants NA etc. is explained when needed. The constants in 
CON A are called attribute names and those in CON NK are called naJUral kind names. 
3. Predicate symbol: E . 
4 Logical symbols: ...., , 1\ , V , ~ , ~ , Y, 3 . 
5. Auxiliary symbols: ( ) , [ ]. 
The formulas of L 5 are built according to the usual rules. D 
I use, among others, the letters 
X, Y, Z, ••• , 
as metavariables over the collection of individual variables. (See appendix 1 for a complete list 
of different types of metavariables.) 
The following meta variables over CON are used. 
c 0 , c 1, .•• , are metavariables over CON, 
~ 0 , ~ 1 , ••• , are metavariables over CONA, and 
{ 0 , { 1, ••• , are metavariables over CON NK. 
Occasionally, I use t as metavariable over terms (i.e. individual variables or constants). The 
reason for underlining the meta variables over CON A and CON NK is that I need the letters a and 
k for metavariables over the individual variables which range over the corresponding sets. An 
example of sets of constant symbols is 
CON A = {ext, name, emp#, ... }, 
CON NK = {Ex-t, Emp , Seer, ... } . 
Then~ denotes any element of CON A and !:._ denotes any element of CONNK. Note that attri-
bute names are written in small letters and natural kind names are written with an initial capital 
letter. The intuitive meaning of the constants in the example strongly suggest that we are talk-
ing about a domain consisting of employee names and employee numbers. These intuitions are 
not wholly accidental, but it must be stressed that they are only warranted in so far as they are 
formalized by the axioms to follow. 
The letters 
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¢, ~,1J 
are metavariables over the set of well-formed formula's (wff's). For example, the formula 
Vx [cp(x)] 
is an expression in the metalanguage (English), from which a formula in L ZF may be gotten by 
replacing ¢ by a string of the symbols listed above and x by an actual variable of Lzp. I follow 
the convention that in cjJ(x) at least x occurs as free variable. 
In the sequel, for ease of writing I use L 5 instead of L 5 (CON). I also assume that we 
are talking about a particular domain language of a particular abstraction of a particular UoD, 
so that it makes sense to talk of the" domain language L 0 . 
2.3.3. Definition 
The symbol 
{x I cjJ(x)} 
is called a class symbol. 
A generalized term is a term or a class symbol. A generalized atomic formula has the form 
where t i are generalized terms. A generali:;:.ed formula is built up accorJing to the usual rules 
from generalized atomic formulas. D 
For example, 
c EX, 
X E y, 
X E {y I cjJ(y) }, 
{x I c/J(x) } E c , and 
{x I <t>(x)} E {y I ~(y)} 
are generalized formulas. All generalized formulas can be translated into formulas (Takeuti & 
Zaring [1971]). For example the last generalized formula is an abbreviation of 
3y[~(y) 1\ Vz[z E y ~¢(:::)]]. 
For brevity, I drop the qualification "generalized" from now on and use the qualification "res-
tricted" instead to indicate that I am not talking about generalized terms etc. 
2.3.4. 
L 5 is a set-theoretical language, which means all functions and predicates must be defined in 
terms of E . I simply assume any relevant mathematical predicate or function to be defined in 
L 5 . free for use in our formal statements about the domain. Thus, I will freely talk ahout sets 
like x xy (the cartesian product of x and y) and ~r ---+ y] (the set of functions from x into y) 
without bothering about their definition. A function f: x ---+ v is a set as well. Formally, 
f: x ---+ y is a three-place predicate on the sets f, x and v. See Takeuti & Zaring [1971] for the 
definitions in ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory) and appendix 2 for a summary. 
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In virtually all domains, IN ~ S. Accordingly, I assume the operations + etc. to be 
defined on IN . If need be, we may as well assume the Peano axioms and real arithmetic to be 
applicable to our domain. This way, we are freed from reinventing wheels designed to cope 
with a restricted formalism and can concentrate on the precise definition of domain structures. 
At the domain level of abstraction we thus have the same flexibility we desire from DBMS's, 
viz. the ad hoc definition of functions and of sets of objects on which these functions are 
defined. 
2.3.5. Definition 
A standard structure for L s is a pair [V, I] where V is a class of sets and I an interpretation 
function such that 
1 . I (c) E D for each c in CON and 
2. I( E ) = E . D 
Thus, the constants are interpreted as sets in V and E is interpreted as the relation "is element 
of" on V. For V, I take the universe defined by the axioms of ZF. This is not essential, the 
only condition on V being that all elements of V are sets, so that x E y always evaluates to 
true or false, for x , y E V. 
By interpreting E as the "element of" relation, we assure that the definitions of functions 
and predicates have the usual meaning. 9 
2.3.6. Definition 
A value assignment in [V, I] is a mapping Q from the individual variables into V. D 
2.3. 7. Definition 
The interpretation of a (restricted) term t in [V, I], given a value assignment Q, is 
[t]] Q .I = Q (x) if t = x , 
[t]]QJ I(c) if t = c. D 
_ denotes syntactic equality. 
2.3.8. Definition 
A restricted atomic formu Ia t 1 E t 2 is true under value assignment Q iff 
[t!IIQ.I E [t2IIg.J· 
We write [V, I] F= Qt 1 E t 2• D 
9. I have now defined a framework in which the domain is an abstraction of the UoD in a set-theoretical 
abstract universe. This is reminiscent of the classical idea that the essence of the world lies in the abstract 
realm of numbers, the only difference being that we now know that sets ure even more basic than numbers 
and that number theory can be reduced to set theory. The description of nature in the language of numbers 
can be traced back to the Pythagoreans, from where it reached modern science via the Neoplatonists and 
Copernicus. See T.S, Kuhn, The Copernican RPvo/ution, Harvard UP [1975]. pp. 128. 141 and A. Koestler. 
The Sleepwalkers, Pelican [1968], p. 201. 
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2.3.9. Definition 
The interpretation of non-atomic formulas is defined in the usual way. 0 
Note that generalized formulas receive an interpretation because they abbreviated restricted for-
mulas. 
2.3.10. Definition 
[V, /] is a model for a set of sentences E iff the sentences are true in [V, I] for all value assign-
ments. The set of all sentences true in [V ,/] is called the theory of [V, /], written Th ( [D, /]). 
Let ~ FOL be an axiomatization of first order logic. The set of all sentences which can be 
derived from E U E FOL is called the set of consequences of E, written Cn (E). An axiomatiza-
tion of [V, /] is called sound if Cn (E)~ Th ([V, /]) and complete if Th ([V, /]) ~ Cn (E). 0 
In the following chapters, I give a set of axioms 
E s = E FOL u E I u E A u E :v 1\ u E SP 
which axiomatize the static part of the domain. 
E FOL is any axiomatization of FOL. One such axiomatization is given in appendix 2. 
E 1 is the set of identity axioms. They are given below. 
E A is the set of attribute axioms or aggregation axioms and is given in chapter 3. 
E NK is the set of natural kind axioms and is given in chapter 3 as well 
ESP is the set of specialization axioms and is given in chapter 4. 
Jointly, they characterize the static structure of the domain as a set of possible worlds. 
Chapter 6 adds more knowledge in the form of static Integrity constraints, which may be viewed 
as FOL formulas to be satisfied by a possible world to count as an admissible world. Because 
FOL inference rules are sound, we have 
Cn(E 0 )~Th([V, /]. 
All statements derivable from E 5 are therefore true. Needless to say, the converse is not true. 
2.4. Identity axioms 
2.4.1. 
The sentences in E 1 are called the identity axioms of the domain theory. There are three iden-
tity axioms. 
1. s: IN -1-1 s onto · 
2. 0 E S. 
3. em E S. 
The set 0 is defined as the class {x I x * x }. It represents the ahsence of a UoD entity. For 
example, if project s 0 whas no members then the appropriate component of its state vector will 
be 0. Similarly, an employees 1 without an address has will have 0 at the component of his 
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state vector representiung his address. Incidentally, in this set-theoretical context 0 
emphasises the role of the number 0, which is the indication of absence 10 . 
0. This· 
The constant em stand for "existence monitor" and will be used in chapter 5 to distinguish 
actual from possible objects in a domain state. 
Axiom 1 requires S to be a countably infinite set of which the elements are named by s. I 
denote s ( i) , i E rN , by s i and treat s i as a name for an identity in S. The axiom contains two 
requirements on the naming function s. 
1. s i * s J for i * j. This is equivalent to an infinite set of unique name axioms (Reiter 
[1984]). They demand that different identity names refer to different identities. 
2. Vx E S 3 i [x = s d. This is Reiter's domain closure axiom. It says that all possibly 
relevant identities are named by s . 
2.4.2. Definition 
Let X E s. If X n s = 0' X is called a primitive identity' otherwise it is called a set identity. 
D 
10. The symbol 0 comes from Hindu mathematics, which derived it from Buddhism. where it stands for 
emptiness, or sunya. Its use in European arithmetic can be traced back no farther than 1478. before which 
date emptiness was inconceivable (and arithmetic very difficult). See Hollingdale & Tootill [1975], p. 22 ff.. 
3 .1. Attributes 
3.1.1. 
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Chapter 3 
Aggregation 
All information beyond the mere fact that certain entities exist is represented by attributes. I 
take a functional view of attributes, i.e. an attribute like age is a function from the set of per-
sons to natural numbers. To facilitate the representation of a change in attribute value, I do not 
represent an attribute by a single function, but by a set of functions. This way, a change in 
attribute value is modeled by a replacement of one function in the attribute by another function 
in the same attribute. We thus maintain the information that the new value is a value of the 
same attribute. 
Each function in an attribute is made into a tvtal function by requiring that NA EE S and 
stipulating that for f E a and x E S, f (x) = NA if a does not apply to x. (NA stands for 
Not Applicable.) We thus take the idea of applicability as unexplicated primitive. The use of 
NA is not very essential but makes life a bit easier. 
The properties of attribute inheritance follow in a simple way from this view of attributes. 
In the following definitions I use 
as meta variable over subsets of S. Thus, k i names an individual variable which is a subset of 
s. 
3.1.2. Definition 
Let k i ~ S. A non-empty set 
is called an attribute. The set k 1 is called the domain of the attribute and k 2 is called the range 
of the attribute. An attribute is said to be applicable to the elements of its domain. 0 
Alternatively, an attribute [k 1 4- k 2] may be viewed as a non-empty set of functions from k 1 
into k 2. I use the symbols 
as metavariables over attributes. Remember that Qi is a meta variable over the set CON A of 
attribute names. The name of an attribute is intended to convey the role of the attribute. We 
have thus made one version of the universal relation assumption that each attribute has the same 
role independent of the context in which it occurs (see section 7.2 for a discussion). 
By demanding that each function in an attribute has the same domain, I have introduced 
the simplification that applicability does not change. This pr<>cludes certain types of change, 
e.g. an employee who changes his job within the same organization, or the introduction of new 
regulations which prescribe new information to be stored (or previously stored information not 
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to be stored). In these types of changes, we may find that some objects have not changed their 
identity but will have new attributes applicable to them. This amounts to replacing an f 1 E a 
by an f 2 E a with a different domain, which is impossible according to the above definition. 
The reason for introducing this simplification is that these more complex types of change cannot 
be described adequately before we have a formalism powerful enough to describe the simpler 
types of change. 
3.1.3. 
The set I: A contains the attribute axioms or aggregation axioms: 
1. NA EE S. 
2. ~ = [k 1 ~ k 2] for each attribute name ~. 
3. VaEA[a=~ 1 V ... Va=~n1· 
Axiom 3 is a kind of closure axiom for attribute names. It is assumed that there are finitely 
many attributes. It may in some cases be more convenient to assume that there are infinitely 
many attributes in the domain. The database stores only finitely many of them and may com-
pute attributes which are related to the stored attributes via static integrity constraints. If we do 
not know how many attributes will become relevant for the UoD, we do not know how many 
attributes are in A . Treating A as an infinite set then represents the fact that we may at any 
time want to define, store or compute a new attribute. 
In case A is infinite, axiom 3 becomes infinite. We can circumvent this by defining the 
set 
and replacing axioms 2 and 3 by 
3a[a: fN ~ d(S)]. 
a(i) can then be treated as a name for an attribute, just as we did with si. However, this has 
the drawback that we cannot talk of the age of a person but must use a i instead, where a i is 
system-generated just as si is system-generated. For this reason, I assume that A is finite but 
large enough to contain all interesting atributes. 11 
3.2. The example domain 
11. The domain language has therefore limited discriminating powers, for two entities may agree in proper-
ties represented by attributes in A but not agree in the properties represented by attributes outside A. As far 
as we can tell in the domain language, the states of those two entities are indistinguishable. Were it not for 
the use of (ad hoc) identities, the principle of Leibniz that indistinguishable entities are identical would not 
be satisfied. It is debatable whether the identity of an object is a property of that object. If it is not, Leibniz" 
principle is violated. 
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3.2.1. 
I use the ubiquitous and simple project/employee example in this report. All employees are 
described by an employee number and a name, and projects by project number, project type, 
and their set of members. Each project member has a task in the project. An employee can be 
a member of arbitrary many projects. 
The set of employees can be partitioned into truck drivers, secretaries and engineers or 
alternatively into temporary and permanent employees. Truck drivers have a drivers licence, 
secretaries a typing speed, engineers a skill, temporary employees a contract, and permanent 
employees a period in which they are in service. A particular type of truck drivers is the type 
of long-distance truck drivers, which in addition to the usual drivers licence have an interna-
tional drivers licence. Some structures will be added for illustrative purposes later on. 
3.2.2. 
To write down the attribute axioms, I need some names for defined sets. Two defined sets I use 
without further comment are 0 and rN . All other defined sets are written in capital letters. 
One such set is ALPHA , which may be thought of as the set of alphabetical entities. The nature 
of the elements of ALPHA is irrelevant for the formal theory, but we may imagine that their ele-
ments will be projected on the screen of a terminal in digestible form as letters and other sym-
bols. The function STRINGS (x) assigns to x the set of all tuples of arbitrary length of elements 
of x and is defined in appendix 2. NAMES is defined as STRING(ALPHA). Definitions of the 
other defined sets are omitted. 
Operations may be defined for the defined sets (such as concatenation for NAMES), so 
that they may be thought of as abstract data types. 
3.2.3. 
The attribute axioms for our example are 
I: A = {NA EE s ' 
Va E A [a = emp# V ... V a = task], 
ext = [Ext -+ .:¥"(S)], 
emp# = [Emp -+ 1- 1 EMP##], 
salary = [Emp -+ rN +], 
name = Emp UProject -+NAMES], 
licence# = [Trucker -+ 1- 1 LICENCE##], 
int -licence# = [Ldtrucker -+I- 1 /NT- LICENCE##], 
typing -speed = [Seer -+ SPEEDS], 
skill = [Eng -+ SKILLS], 
contr# [Contract -+I- 1 CONTRACT##], 
#years = [Perm -+ rN ] 
project#= [Project -+ 1- 1 PROJECT##], 
project -type = [Project -+ PROJECT- TYPES], 
members = [Project-+ .'fi(Emp X TASK)]}. 
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.ff(x) is the set of finite subsets of x . 
3.2.4. 
The attribute axioms define an aggregation graph as follows. The graph contains one node for 
each domain and range of an attribute and one directed egde for each attribute. The nodes are 
labelled by the expressions defining the domain and range of attributes. There is an arrow 
labelled ~ from node labelled k 1 to the node k 2 if a = [k 1 - k 2]. In general, the graph is 
disconnected, as shown in figure 3. 
Emp Emp U Project Trucker Ldtrucker 
!~ !=re ! lire=# ! int-licence# 
EMP## NAMES liCENCE## INT-UCENCE## 
Seer Eng Temp Penn 
ltyping-speed lski/1 1 contract# 
SPEEDS SKILLS CONTRACT## IN 
Project 
project# project-type member 
PROJECT## PROJECT-TYPES Emp X TASKS 
Figure 3. 
Note that we may have 
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Only if this is known not to be the case in the domain, can the aggregation graph be called an 
aggregation hierarchy. The domain can then be viewed as a collection of atoms (surrogates to 
which no attributes apply) aggregated into more complex objects. 12 In general, there will be 
cycles in the aggregation graph. An example in a UoD of employees, managers and depart-
ments is 
manager = [Dept -+ Emp] 
dept = [Emp -+Dept]. 
3.3. Attributes, properties and operations 
3.3.1. Definition 
For f E a and x E S, f (x) is called an attribute value or contingent property of x . A func-
tion f: S X ••• x S -+ S is called an operation. f (x 1, ... , x n) is called a necessary property of 
x 1, ••• , Xn. D 
Later, the notion of property will be related to worlds (domain states). For a possible 
world w, I will define the attribute value of a on x in w as a w (x). This value is a contingent 
property of x in w . x may have different contingent properties for the same attribute in dif-
ferent worlds. For example, a car may be red in one world but blue in another. In these two 
possible states, the car has two different contingent properties. 
This contrasts with operations. For example, a set y of cars has a cardinality, which is the 
value of the unary operation I . I on x. The cardinality of y is the same in all possible worlds. 
In terms of modal logic, it is a necessary property of y that it has the cardinality it has; it could 
not be otherwise. Thus, the color of a car is a contingent property of that car, but the cardinal-
ity of a set of cars is a necessary property of that set. 
3.3.2. 
An attribute is called variable if its value may be changed. Otherwise it is called constant. D 
For example, the color of a car is a variable attribute. In a domain where people may not 
change names, name is a constant attribute of a person. Note that the name of a person is- con-
tingent (it could have been otherwise) but constant (once given, a name must not be changed). 
These definitions can be given more precisely when a state transition function has been defined 
for objects. This is done in Wieringa [forthcoming], but because the distinctions made are so 
important already in the static phase of domain specification, I draw them here already. 
12. That this must be the case, as Leibniz (and the e;.ut.) Wingenstein) thought. seems to be a matter of 
metaphysical belief for which no good argument has yet been found. ''And there must be: simple substances. 
since there are composites: for the composite is nothing else than an accumulation or aggregate of the simple 
... Thus these monads are the veritable atoms of nature, and in one word. the elements of all things." Para-
graphs 2 and 3 of the Monadology. in P. Schrecker & A.M. Schrecker (trans.). G.W. Leibniz, Monadology 
and Other Essays, Un. of Stockholm. 1978. 
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Chapter 4 
The generalization hierarchy 
4.1. Types and kinds, natural and unnatural 
4.1.1. 
There are a number of terms in use to indicate the nature of a collection of objects. In com-
puter science, the words "type," "class," "sort," and "abstract datatype" are in use. In 
·mathematics, "set," "class" (in a different meaning) and "bag" are common. Looking further 
abroad, in philosophy the term "natural kind" is used to indicate a collection of objects which 
are similar in structure. In biology, terms like "species," genus," "order," and "family" are 
used to describe the classes into which living things can be ordered. I use some of these terms 
with meanings which at once stay close to what is usually intended with them in the sciences 
they are borrowed from and given precise meaning in the ABSURD model. A preliminary list-
ing follows. 
1. Natural kind. This will be used for a set of surrogates with the same aggregation struc-
ture, i.e. the set of all possible object identities such that the same attributes are applicable 
to the identities. In relational terms, this corresponds to the intension of a relation 
scheme. The term "natural kind" is inspired by linguistic philosophy, where it means a set 
of objects with the same underlying (i.e. empirically validated, scientific) structure (see 
Schwartz [1977], especially Quine's essay). A much used example of a natural kind is 
gold. Natural kinds have names that are rigid designators, i.e. the name refers to the same 
set of possible objects in all possible worlds. 
To the idea of structural isomorphy is added the dynamic concept of dynamic isomorphy. 
In Wieringa [forthcoming], all members of a natural kind execute the same general pro-
cess. Thus, employees, projects, departments etc. have the same static and dynamic struc-
ture. 
This does not exhaust the concept of natural kind in DB domain specification, but it goes a 
long way. For example, all persons form a natural kind because they are isomorphic (at a 
certain level of abstraction) and have the same life cycle. But this isomorphy is just iso-
morphy in attribute applicability. That excludes specialization to sub kinds by restriction 
on allowable attribute values. People below 65 years have the same aggregation structure 
as people above 65 years of age and also execute the same generic process. But they may 
be said to belong to different natural subkinds of the natural kind People, for they enjoy 
different priviliges (in Holland) concerning public transport, cultural activities etc. The 
problem is, not any arbitrary predicate on attribute values selects a natural kind. The set 
of people above 67 years of age whose surname begins with an "S" is not a natural kind 
-unless there is a generic process applicable to precisely that set of people. This suggests 
that the concept could be extended from the conjunction "same aggregation structure and 
same generic process" to the disjunction "same aggregation structure or same generic pro-
cess." 
But even this does not exhaust the concept of natural kind. In biology, the concept of 
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natural kinds crucially involves common descent ( Mayr [1982]). This may be relevant to 
DB domains in as far as there, natural kinds evolve as well. New attributes emerge and 
old ones become obsolete. But again, not just any replacement of an aggregation structure 
or generic process by any other will be acceptable as evolution of natural kinds. Investiga-
tion of these problems will be a topiv for future research. 
2. Kind. Any set of surrogates is called a kind. This is just to have a uniform terminology. 
Some kinds have the special property of being natural. 
3. Type. Any set of attributes is called a type. This corresponds to the relation scheme of 
relational theory. If a type is the type of a natural kind, it is called a natural type. 
4. Class. Any set of objects is called a class. If the identities of the objects in a class are a 
natural kind, we call it a natural class. The elements of a class are thus objects With an 
internal state. This aggrees with the concept of class in object-oriented systems. We can 
have two classes consisting of objects with the same set of identities but in different states. 
Those classes are then of the same kind. 
5. Extension. A kind is a set of possible object identities. I define a world as a set of 
objects with different identities and call the set of identities of objects in a world the 
existence set of that world. The intersection of a kind k with the existence set of w is 
called the extension of k in w . This corresponds roughly to the relation instance of rela-
tional·theory. We can also talk of the extension of a type or of a class in a world. 
There are a number of related concepts not mentioned in the above list. Most prominently is 
the concept of Abstract Data Type (ADT), which, according to one definition, is a collection of 
sets (called sorts) together with functions on those sets (called operations). ADT's are timeless 
versions of natural kinds. In Wieringa [forthcoming] I define for each natural kind a set of 
events and a generic process composed of those events. Each object of the natural kind exe-
cutes an instance of the generic process of the kind. The natural kind corresponds to the sort of 
an ADT and the set of events to the operations defined on the sort. If the natural kind has sub-
kinds, these correspond to sub sorts of a sort in a many-sorted ADT. The difference is that 
1. the objects of a natural kind have an internal state and those of an ADT do not, and 
2. the effect of an event depends upon the state of the domain in which it is executed (it is 
contingent) whereas the result of an operation is independent of the state of the world (it 
necessarily gives the same result in any world). 
ADT's appear in this report as atomic kinds (e.g. IN). 
4.1 .2. Definition 
A subset of A is called a type. The letters 
will be used as metavariables over types. 
The largest type of k is the set 
type(k) ={a E A / k~dom(a)}. 
Each subset of type (k) is called a tvpe of k 0 
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4.1.3. Definition 
A subset of S is called a kind. We use the letters 
ko, kt, ... , 
as metavariables over kinds. If t is a type, the kind of t is the set 
kind ( t) = {x E S I · V a E t [x E dom (a ) ]} . D 
Thus, any set of attributes is a type and any set of identities a kind. We can prove a number of 
general things for kinds and types. In the following theorem, t and k are universally quanti-
fied. Thus, 4 is an abbreviation of 
4.1.4. Theorem 
1. kind ( 0) = S . 
2. type(0)=A. 
3. kind ( t) = n dom (a ) . 
a E I 
4. k~kind(t)"*t~type(k). 
5. t 1 ~ t 2 :::} kind ( t 2) ~ kind ( t 1) . 
6. k 1 ~ k 2 :::}type (k 2) ~ type(k 1). 
Proof. 
1 and 2. Immediate. 
3. X E kind (t) "* v a E t [x E dom (a ) ] "* X E n dom (a ) . 
a E I 
4. k ~kind(t) "* Vx E k Va E t[x E dom(a)]"* V a E t V x E k [x E dom (a ) ] <=> 
t~type(k). 
5. If kind(t 2) = 0, then kind(t 2)~kind(t 1 ). So let kind(t 2) ::1= 0 and choose x E kind(t 2). 
Thenx Ekind(t 2):::} Va[a Et 2 :::}x Edom(a)]. Butt 1 ~t 2,so Va[a Et 1:::}x Edom(a)], 
so x E kind (t 1) . 
6. If k 1 ~k 2 , Va[a E type(k 2)~k 2 ~dom(a)]:::} Va[a E type(k 2):::}k 1 ~dom(a)]:::} 
Va[a E type(k 2):::}a E type(k 1)]:::} type(k 2)~type(k 1 ). D 
The duals of 1 and 2 are not true in general. type (S) is the set of attributes applicable to all 
identities, so type (S) = 0 if there is no attribute applicable to all identities. 
kind(A) is the set of identities to which all attributes are applicable, so kind(A) = 0 if 
there is no identity to which all attributes apply. But by definition, we have 0 E kind(A ). 
Part 3 says simply that the kind of a type is just the intersection of the domains of the attri-
butes in the type. The intuitive meaning of 4 is that if we remove an attribute from a type, we 
may increase the set of identities to which the remaining attributes are applicable. Similarly, if 
we remove a identity from a kind, we may get a kind to which more attributes are applicable. 
It is not in general true that 
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kind (t) ~ k ~type (k) ~ t. 
As an example of 
kind (t) S k ~ type (k) S t, 
take the kind {emp#, dept#}. Using intuitive interpretations of the attribute names (employee 
number and department number), kind ( {emp#, dept#}) = 0 ~ k for any k ~ S. But in gen-
eral, for any k ~ S, type (k) ~ 0. 
As an example of 
type(k)~t ~ kind(t), 
take John and d to be names of identities for a particular person and a particular department in 
a domain where persons and departments have nothing m common. Then 
type({John, d}) = 0~t for any t. But in general, kind(t) ~ {John, d}. 
Similarly, to show that the converse of 6 does not hold in general, we have 
type ({John, d }) ~type (k) for any k ~ S, but in general, k ~ {John, d }. 
Finally, as a counterexample of the converse of 5, let kind ({typing -speed} be the set of 
secretaries and kind ({contract#}) be the set of temporary employees. If management has 
decreed that only secretaries can be temporary employees, then 
kind ( {contract# } ) ~kind ( {typing -speed } ) . But {()ping -speed } ~ {contract# } . 
The following two simple corrolaries of the theorem introduce the definition of natural 
kinds (types). t and k are again universally quantified. 
4.1.5. Corollary 
1. t~type(kind(t)). 
2. k r;i:kind(type(k)). 
Proof. 
1. By 4.1.4.4, kind(t)r;i:kind(t)~tr;i:type(kind(l)). 
2. Analogous. D 
If we take a set k of identities, gather the set t of attributes applicable to all members of k, then 
k will be contained in the set of all identities to which the attributes in t are applicable. This 
strongly suggests the following definition for natural kinds. 
4.1.6. Definition 
A natural kind is a set of identities such that k = kind (type (k)). A natural type is a type such 
that t = type(kind(t)). We use 
i: 0 , i: 1, ... , as meta variable over the natural kinds and 
I 0 , I 1, ... , as meta variable over natural types. D 
There is a simple criterion for natural kindhood, stated in the following theorem. 
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4.1. 7. Theorem 
1 . k is a natural kind iff there is a type t with k = kind ( t). 
2. t is a natural type iff there is a kind k with t = type (k). 
Proof. 
1. If k is a natural kind, then there is a t with k = kind (t), for take t = type (k). Conversely, 
assume that k = kind (t) for a t. Then by 4.1.5.1, t ~type (kind (t)), so that 
kind (type (kind (t))) ~kind (t). 
But by 4.1.5.2, 
kind (t) ~kind (type (kind (t))), 
so kind ( t) = kind (type (kind ( t))), so that k is a natural kind. 
2. Analogous. 0 
A natural kind is thus the largest kind of a type. For natural kinds and types, the counterexam-
ples given above are not valid and we have the following theorem. (All variables universally 
quantified.) 
4.1.8. Theorem 
1. type(k) = 0 "'*" = S. 
2. kind(!) = 0 "'*' =A. 
3. kind (t)subsetk ¢*type (k) ~I. 
4. k 1 ~k 2 ¢*type(-k 2)~type(k 1). 
5. 1 1 ~ 1 2 ¢* kind ( t 2) ~kind (I 1). 
Proof. 
1. k = kind(type(k)} = kind(0) = S. 
2. Analogous. 
3. kind (I)~ k ¢* type (i:) ri:_ type (kind (I))¢* type(~) ri:_l. 
4. type (k 2) r;;E: type (i: 1) "'* kind (type (i: 1)) r;;E: kind (type (i: 2)) "'* k: 1 r;;E: i: 2 . 
5. Analogous. 0 
4.1.9. Corollary 
1. kind (I) = k ¢* 1 = type (i:) . 
2. k is a natural kind iff type (k) is a natural type. 
3. t is a natural type iff kind ( t) is a natural kind. 
Proof. 
1. Immediate. 
2. k is a natural kind iff k = kind(type(k)) iff rype(k) = type(kind(type(k))) iff type(k) is a 
natural type. 
3. Analogous. 0 
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For natural kinds and types, kind and type are each other's inverse. The type of a natural kind 
is natural and vice versa. All of this suggests that the natural kind lattice is inverted in the 
natural type lattice. The next section shows that this is not quite so. 
The following theorem gives another criterion for natural kinds and types. 
4.1.10. Theorem 
1. k is a natural kind iff Vk'[type(k) = type(k')~k'~k]. 
2. t isanaturaltypeiff Vt'[kind(l) = kind(t')~t'~t]. 
Proof. 
1. If k 1s a natural kind, then type (k) 
k = kind(type(k'))2k'. 
type(k') ~ kind(type(k) = kind(type(k')) ~ 
Conversely, given Vk' [type(k) = type(k') ~k' ~k] we have to prove kind(type(k))~k. This 
follows from type(kind(type(k))) = type(k) and the premiss, so we have to prove 
type(kind(type(k)))~type(k). If the left hand side is empty, there is nothing to prove, so 
choose a E type(kind(type(k))). Then kind(type(k))~dom(a), so k~dom(a), so 
a E type (k). 
2. Analogous. 0 
A set of two truck drivers and a set of three truck drivers are both of the same type. This 
theorem says that that natural kind of truck drivers is the largest of the sets of that type, which 
is the set of all actual and possible truck drivers. 
The set of all actual and possible truck drivers and one secretary is not a natural kind, 
because we can add more secretaries without changing type. The largest set of objects which 
have that same type is a natural kind again. This may well be the set of employees. 
Continuing in this vein, we get the largest possible natural kind, which is S. 
Similarly, a natural type is the largest set of attributes of a given kind. In our example, 
{emp#} is not a natural type because name is applicable to employees as well. {emp#, name} 
is a natural type, for adding one more attribute would decrease the kind of the type. 
{emp#, project#} is not a natural type, for {emp#. project#, name} describes the same kind, 
viz. 0 . The largest natural type is A . 
4.1.11. Corollary 
1. S is a natural kind and A is a natural type. 
2. k 0 is a natural kind, where k 0 is the largest set of identities to which all attributes apply. 
3. t 0 is a natural type, where t 0 is the largest set of attributes applicable to all identities. 
Proof. 
Immediate. D 
Usually, k0 = t 0 = 0. 
The concept of natural kind introduced here is minimal in that it is just the largest set of 
(identities of) objects described by a type. Subkinds which are described by the same attributes 
but have different attribute values are not counted as natural kinds in this view, unless an extra 
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attribute is applicable to identities of the sub kind. 
For example, the set of employees is a natural kind and the set of employees and one 
screw-driver is not. However, the set of senior employees will be a natural kind according to 
our criterion only if it is the largest set to which a given set of attributes applies. If there is no 
extra attribute applicable to senior employees, our criterion will not single it out as a natural 
kind. The criterion of attribute applicability is thus not comprehensive, but I claim that at least 
it does not elevate unnatural kinds to natural kindhood. 
4.1.12. 
The set CON NK contains the constant symbol NK and names for natural kinds in the domain. 
we use 
~0• ~!• ..• , 
as meta variable over CON NK. I: NK 1s the smallest set of sentences containing the following 
axioms. 
1. NK~S. 
2. ~i E NK for each natural kind name in ~; in CONNK. 
3. kind (type({;) = {; for each natural kind name ~i in CON NK. 
Because a type is natural iff its kind is natural, we do not introduce names for natural types. 
Note that we do not have a "natural kind name closure axiom." In the next section we prove 
that the intersection of two natural kinds is a natural kind, and having to think of names for all 
non-empty intersections of natural kinds is a bit tedious. 
We use names which start with a capital letter for natural kinds. In our example, we intro-
duce the following natural kind names and axioms. 
CON NK = {S, Emp, Trucker, Ldtrucker, Seer, Eng, Temp, Perm, Project} 
I: NK = {NK ~ cP(S) 
{S, Emp, ... , Project} ~NK, 
kind(type(Emp)) = Emp, 
kind(type(Project)) =Project}. 
4.2. Attribute inheritance 
4.2.1. Definition 
If t 1 C t 2 , t 2 is called a specialization of t 1 and t 1 a generalization of t 2. t 2 is said to inherit the 
attributes in t 1• We also say that kind (t 1) is a specialization of kind ( t 2). 0 
In other words, to specialize a type is to add attributes, to generalize it is to remove attributes. 
This is the most general type of specialization, specialization by auribute inheritance. 
The following theorem shows why the kind and type lattices are not completely each 
other's inverse. There is a dual to this theorem .,, hich can be gotten by replacing kind by type 
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and t by k. 
4.2.2. Theorem 
n n 
1. n kind ( t i) = kind ( u t i) . 
i = l i = l 
n n 
2. u kind(ti)~kind( n ti) 
i = l i = l 
Proof. 
n n 
1. t 1 ~ U t 1 for j = 1, ... , n , so kind ( U t 1) ~ kind (t 1 ) for j = 1 , ... , n and therefore i = l i = l 
n n n 
kind ( u t i) ~ n kind (t i). To prove the reverse, let X E 
i = l i = l 
n kind(ti). Then X E kind(ti) for 
i = l 
i = 1, ... , n , so Va E t 1 [x E dom (a)] for i=l, ... ,n and therefore, 
n n 
Va E U t 1[x E dom(a)] so thatx E kind( U t 1). i = l i = l 
n n 
2. n ti~t; for j = 1, ... , n, so kind(t;)~kind( n ti), for j 
i = l i = l 
1 , ... , n and therefore 
n n 
u kind(t;)~kind( n ti). 0 
i = l i = l 
The reverse of 2 is not true in general, for 
n 
x E U kind(t 1) 4> s E kind(t 1), i= 1, ... , n. 
i=l 
n 
Consider the types t!> ... , tn. Their least upper bound (lub) is U t 1 and their greatest lower /=1 
n 
bound (glb) is n t 1 . The theorem. says that the lu b of t 1 goes with kind to the glb of the /=1 
corresponding set of kinds, but that the glb of t 1 does not necessarily go to the lub of the 
corresp.onding kinds. Figures 4 and 5 show what is going on. 
Figure 4 shows multiple attribute inheritance. t inherits all attributes in each t 1 and is 
mapped by kind to the intersection of the kind ( t 1). 
Figure 5 shows single inheritance. The t 1 inherit all attributes from t and each possibly has 
some extra attributes as well. kind(t) contains all kind(t 1) but may contain extra identities as 
well. For example, if {emp#, name} is the type of all employees and {emp#, name, skill} and 
{emp#, name, typing -speed} are the types of engineers and secretaries, respectively, then 
t 
1 
t= uti 
a 
t= nr i 
t 
n 
t 
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kind(t 1 ) 
Figure 4. 
n 
kind(t .) 
I 
Figure 5. 
kind(t n ) 
n kind(t .) 
I 
b 
u kind(t .J c kind( n r. J 
I I 
kind(t ) 
n 
b 
kind ( { emp#, name , skill } U { emp#, name , typing -speed } ) ~kind ( {emp#, name } ) . 
But in case there is also a type {emp#, name, licence#} of employees who are truck drivers, 
kind ( {emp#, name}) is not exhausted by the sets of secretaries and engineers. In general, when 
we specialize a type t to types t i, we may fail to be able to describe all identities in kind (t) by 
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To reach clarity in the domain structure (and to facilitate the definition of processes exe-
cuted by members of a natural kind), we are interested in specializations which partition the 
kind of the generalization, i.e. where kind(£) = Ukind(t 1 ) and the kind(t 1) are pairwise dis-
joint. 
4.2.3. Definition 
The kinds k 1 , i = 1, ... , n partition k if k = U k 1 and the k 1 are pairwise disjoint. They are a 
subdivision of k if U k 1 ~ k and the k 1 are pairwise disjoint. 
The types t 1 , i = 1, ... , n are a specialization group oft if the kind(t 1) subdivide kind(t). 
They are an exhaustive specialization group if the subdivision is a partition. 0 
An example of a kind with two partitions is the kind emp of employees, partitioned by secre-
taries, engineers and truck -drivers as well as by temporary -ernps and permanent -emps. It 
must be emphasized that it may· not be known to the system designer or user whether a set of 
kinds partitions or even subdivides a given kind. For example, a new kind of employee, depart-
ment heads, may be hired, who differ in kind from any employee hired hitherto. Since emp 
contains all past, present and future actual and possible identities, the division by secretaries, 
engineers and truck -drivers has never been exhaustive, except that we did not know it. Simi-
larly, we may create a kind of employees who double as secretaries and engineers. If we previ-
ously though these two kinds were disjoint, we were wrong. 
The declaration that a kind is partitioned or subdivided by a group of kinds should be 
viewed as a belief about the domain at the time we make that statement; or alternatively, it may 
be viewed as a decision to constrain the behavior of the domain in a certain way, e.g. as the 
decision never to hire department heads; or again, as the decision not to represent the hiring of 
department heads. 
We usually declare a group of kinds k 1 to be a subdivision or partition of k by declaring 
type (k 1) to be an (exhaustive) specialization group of rype (k). The following theorem expli-
cates what it is we are then declaring. 
4.2.4. Theorem 
1. kind(ti u tj) = 0' i * j' iff the [i are a specialization group of n ti. 
2. kind(nt 1 )~ Ukind(t 1)¢}kind(nt1) = Ukind(t 1). 
Proof. 
Trivial. 0 
We do not want to give subdivision or partition relations between any odd group of kinds, but 
only between natural kinds. For natural kinds, the first part of the previous theorem can be 
simplified a bit. 
4.2.5. Theorem 
If t, t i are the natural types corresponding to i-, i- 1 , i I, ... , n, then 
1. r~n(~¢}u"~~"· 
2. · r = n r, ¢} u", = ". 
Proof. 
Trivial. 0 
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When we provide names for natural kinds in CON NK, it is good to know that NK is a meet-
semilattice (and similarly, the set of natural types is a meet-semilattice). 
4.2.6. Theorem 
If k l n k 2 * 0, then it is a natural kind. 
Proof. 
Let type (k) = type (.k 1 n.k 2), then to prove that k ~ .k 1 n .k 2 . Of k = e ,pty, there is nothing to 
prove, so choose x E k. Then 
{x}~k"* 
type (k) ~type ( {x }) "* 
type (.k l n k 2) ~type ( {x }) "* 
type (k 1 n k 2) n type (k 1) ~type ({X}) n type (.k 1) "* 
type (.k 1) ~type ( {x } U .k 1). 
But also .k 1 ~ .k 1 U {x } "*type ( {x} U k 1) ~type (J 1), so type (i 1) = type (.k 1 U {x}). Because 
.k E NK,.k 1 U{x}~.k 1 ,sox E .k 1• Sok~.k 1 and bysymmetry,k~.k 2 • Sok~.k 1 n.k 2 . 0 
It is not true in general that .k 1 U .k 2 E NK. For example, let Emp be the natural kind of 
employees and Dep the natural kind of departments. If Pro} is the set of projects, then 
type(Emp UDep) = 0 = type(Dep UProj), but Dep UProj ~ Emp UDep. 
4.2. 7. Definition 
The meet-semilattice formed by NK is called the specialization hierarchy of the domain. 0 
We like the specialization hierarchy to be as well-structured as possible, i.e to allow only parti-
tions and subdivisions. These are defined by a set ESP of specialization axioms for natural 
kinds. For each natural kind name !5. in CONNK and subdivision !I:.i of /5. we add the sentences 
1. 
2. k. n k . for i = }. 
_z -J 
to ESP. Similarly for partitions, where in 1 we have an equals sign. 
The specialization axioms in our example are 
E sP = {S = Emp U Project U Project -member, 
Emp nProject = 0, Emp n Project -member = 0, Project nProject -member = 0, 
Emp = Trucker U Seer U Eng, 
Trucker n Seer = 0, Trucker n Eng 
Ldtrucker ~Trucker, 
Emp = Temp U Perm, 
Temp n Perm = 0 }. 
0, Seer nEng 0, 
Figure 6 visualizes these axioms as a directed graph (the implicit direction of the edges is down-
wards). An arc through edges leaving a node indicates pairwise dtsjointess of the nodes pointed 
at. 
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s 
Emp Project 
Trucker Seer Eng Perm Temp 
1 
Ldtrucker 
Figure 6. 
Note that, by theorem 4.2.6, the following kinds are natural in addition to the ones shown 
in the figure: 
4.2.8. 
Trucker n Temp, Trucker n Pe-rm, 
Seer n Temp, Seer n Perm, 
Eng n Temp , Eng n Perm, 
Ldtrucker n Temp, Ldtrucker n Perm. 
We now have introduced all axioms of E 0 . In appendix 4, a model for I: 0 is exhibited. Basi-
cally, the idea is to interpret S as IN and define the natural kinds in such a way that I: SP is 
satisfied. This also gives an idea how a model for a domain theory can be implemented, by 
assigning global database identifiers to objects in such a way that the form of the identifier 
betrays the kind of the object identified. 
4.3. Classifications 
4.3.1. Definition 
The classifications of x E S are the set 
classes{x) = {k I 3t~A[k = kind(l)!\t~rvpe({x})}. 0 
The classifications of an identity are the set of all natural kinds as which it can be classified. 
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The largest set of attributes applicable to x is type ( {x}), so that the smallest natural kind of x is 
kind (type ( {x }) . We prove these statements and some other simple properties of classes (x) 
below. 
4.3.2. Theorem 
Letx E S. 
1. If k E classes (x), then x E k . 
2. tub (classes (x)) = S E classes (x) . 
3. glb (classes (x)) = kind (type ( {x })) E 
n 
4. Ifk 1, ••• ,kn E classes (x)' then n k i i=l 
Proof. 
1. Trivial. 
classes (x). 
E classes (x). 
2. tub (classes (x)) 
kind(0) = S. 
U kind(t) 
t ~type( {x }) 
S E classes (x), because 0 ~type ( {x }) and 
3. glb(classes(x)) n kind (l) 
t~type({x }) 
=kind( U t) = kind(type( {x })) E classes(x). 
t ~type ( {x }) 
4. Because k 1 E classes(x), ki = kind(ti) for a ti~type({x}). But 
n n 
n kind(ti) =kind( uti) = kind(to), where to= nri. 
i=l i=l i 
t 0 ~ type ( {x } ) , and so n k t = kind (t 0) E classes (x). 0 
i 
But because t i ~type ( {x }) , 
Part 2 says that S is the largest kind of any identity. It is the weakest classification of x and 
says nothing else that the identity possibly exists. Moreover, S is the union of all the classes of 
x . Part 3 says that the smallest kind of a identity is the kind of its largest type, type ( {x }) , and 
part 3 and 5 imply that this is the intersection of all the natural kinds of x . This proves the fol-
lowing corollary. 
4.3.3. Corollary 
1. kind (type ({x } ) ) n k. 
k E classes (x) 
2. s u k. 
k E classes (x) 
Proof. Immediate. 0 
For example, let !0 be a long distance truck driver in permanent employment. Then 
classes (l 0) = {Ldtrucker, Ldtrucker n Perm, 
Trucker, Trucker n Perm, 
Emp, Emp n Perm, 
Perm,S}. 
These are the nodes on the paths in the specialization hierarchy from its smallest kind, 
Ldtrucker n Perm, to its largest kind, S. Ldtrucker n Perm is the bottom of the classifications 
of l 0 . We can prove some properties of the bottom of the taxonomic hierarchy for a identity. 
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4.3.4. Definition 
The smallest kind of x E s is 
classes J.. (x) = kind(type( {x })). 0 
To prove some properties of classes J.. (x), the following lemma is useful. 
4.3.5. Lemma 
Vx, y E S[x E classes J.. (y) ~type ( {y }) ~type ( {x })]. 
Proof. 
For x , y E S we have 
x E classes l. (y) ~x E kind (type ( {y })) ~type ( {y }) ~type ( {x}). 0 
4.3.6. Theorem 
1. Vx E S [x E classes J.. (x )]. 
2. Vx, y, z E S [x E classes J.. (y) /\ y E classes J.. (z) =H E classes J.. (z) ]. 
3. Vx, y E S [y E classes J.. (x) ~classes J.. (y) ~classes J.. (x)]. 
4. Vx,y E S[y E classes.~.(x)~classes(x)~classes(y)]. 
Proof. 
1. By 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.3. 
2. For x, y, z E S 
x E classes J.. (y) /\ y E classes J.. (z) ~ 
type ( {y } ) ~ type ( {x } ) /\ type ( {z } ) ~ type ( {y } ) => 
type ( {z }) ~type ( {x }) ~ 
x E classes J.. (z). 
3. =>: If y E classes J.. (x) then by 2 for all z E classes J.. (y) we have -. E classes J.. (x), so 
classes .l. (y) ~classes .l. (x). 
*": Conversely, if classes .l. (y)?;;; classes .l. (x), then because y E classes J.. (y), 
y E classes .l. (x). 
4. =>: Let y E classes .l. (x) and choose k E classes (x). Then there is a t ~type ( {x } ) with 
k = kind (t). Because classes .l. (x) is the glb of classes (x), classes .l. (x) ~ k, so y E kind (t) 
andtherefore {y}~kind(t). Butthent?;;,type({y}),sok = kind(t) E classes(y)). 
*": Let classes (x)?;;; classes (y). Since classes .L (x) E classes (x), classes .l. (x) E classes (y). 
But then classes .L (y) glb (classes (y))?;;; classes .L (x). Because y E classes .l. (y), 
y E classes J.. (x). D 
Part 1 and 2 say that the relation x E skmind (y) is reflexive and transitive, but 3 says that it 
falls short of being an equivalence relation. For example, if ! 0 E Ldtrucker and 
t 0 E Trucker -Ldtrucker and both are in permanent employment, then 
classes .L (l 0) = Ldtrucker n Penn and 
classes 1. (t 0) = Trucker n Penn. 
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These two kinds are neither equal not disjoint, since the first is genuinely contained in the 
second. Part 4 says that all natural kinds of t 0 are also natural kinds of l 0 . As a matter of fact, 
! 0 has two more natural kinds than t0 , Ldtrucker and Ldtrucker nPenn. 
The situation would have been different if there would have been a kind Sdtrucker (for 
short distance truck driver) such that Ldtrucker and Sdtrucker jointly partition Trucker. Then 
all specialization groups whould have been exhaustive and S would have been partitioned by the 
smallest kinds, so that x E classes .L (y) would have been an equivalence relation. 
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Chapter 5 
Objects and possible worlds 
5 .1. Objects 
5.1.1. 
Up till now, we have looked merely at the identities of objects. We now introduce the concept 
of state so as to define an object as a pair (identity, state). To define a state as a tuple of attri-
bute values, we must associate a position in a state vector with an attribute. This is done simply 
by numbering the attributes. 
5.1.2. Definition 
A numbering of attributes is a bijection 
·A -1-1 
v · onto 
where I . I denotes the cardinality of a set. 0 
For finite sets of attributes, the set I A I is {0, ... , I A I -1}. The numbering v is kept fixed 
during the rest of this paper. 
5 .1.3. Definition 
For each finite t ~A, define v 1 : t - It I by 
iff Vb E t, v(a) ;;;,; v(b) 
max (v 1 (b))+l otherwise. 0 bE I, v(b) < v(a) 
v 1 simply numbers the attributes in t in increasing order of v-numbering, starting with 0. It is 
easy to see that this is a bijection t - I t I and that v = v A . 
5 .1.4. Definition 
For x E S, the set of t-states of x is defined by 
states1(x) = rangex(v 1- 1(l))x · · · Xranger(v;- 1( It 1)). 
The elements of states 1 (x) may be called t-aggregates if we take a static view of the domain, t-
state vectors if we take a dynamic view of the domain, or t-tuples if we view the model as a 
relational database. A tuple a consists of a number of components which are addressed as (t) i. 
0 
We use 
as metavariables over states. Context will make clear with respect to which type the vector is 
taken. 
The components of the tuples in states 1 (x) are placed in the unique order imposed by v. 
We have defined states 1 (x) for arbitrary t and x. In general, we are interested only in the state 
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vectors containing values other than NA, i.e. state vectors containing values of applicable attri-
butes. All these values are contained in the longest state vector of an object, defined as follows. 
5 .1.5. Definition 
The state space of x is the set 
states (x) = states type( {x n<x). 
The elements of states (x) are called the longest state vectors of x . D 
The term longest state vector is not completely accurate, for the longest state vectors are of 
course the elements of states A (x). The term should be read as short for "longest significant 
state vector." 
We can now define the concept of an object. 
5.1.6. Definition 
An object is a pair (x, a) with x E S and a E states (s). We use 
oo, o 1• ••• , 
as meta variables over objects. If o is the object (x, a), x is called the identity of the object, 
written id ( o) = x , and a is called the internal state of the object, written st ( o) = a. 
A class is a set of objects. D 
An object may have a very complex structure. Any of the components of its state vector may 
be a set of surrogates and any component may be the identity of another object. Moreover, this 
may be realized in the same component, i.e. if o 0 = (x 0 , ( .•. , x 1, ••• )), we may have that 
x 1 = {y 0 , ••• ,yn} and there may be another object o 1 = (x 1,(z 0 , .•• ,Zn))• and so on recur-
sively. Note that the wff 
(xl, (zo •... , Zn)) =({yo, ... , YnL (zo. ···• Zn)) 
is a strict identity. 
It is interesting to look at real-world objects displaying this complex structure. Some 
examples which come to mind are: 
1. A gas is a finite set {s 0, ••• , s n } of molecules which has certain properties 
(s n + 1, ••• , s m +n). Some of its properties are volume, pressure and temperature. These 
would be deducible from the properties of the individual gas molecules s i, i = 0, ... , n 
via statistical gas laws, but no data are kept about these molecules and they are not named 
individually. They are therefore not represented by surrogates. 
2. A farmer may posses a set {s 0 , ... , sn} of animals which are named individually. The set 
itself may have certain properties (sn+I• ... , sm+n) such as feeding cost, total investment 
and number of visits of the animal doctor which are not deducible from the properties of 
the elements of the set. (There may be discounts on large amounts of food and on one 
visit the doctor may treat several animals.) Note that if an animal is added or removed 
from the set, a new set which is the identity of a different object comes into being. The 
bearer of these changes could be defined as the identity of the farm object, which has an 
attribute animals . 
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3. A democratically organized project may have an attribute members whose value is the set 
of employees working on the project. This set has certain properties, such as average 
salary or the number of people currently working on the project. These properties are 
deducible from the properties of the elements (average salary) or are defined analytically 
for the set itself (cardinality). 
These examples illustrate some of the design considerations for objects. First, there is the 
difference between sets and aggregates. In general, the elements of a set do not play distin-
guishable roles in the set, whereas the components of an aggregate do. The role of a com-
ponent in an aggregate is indicated intuitively by its name and represented formally by the set 
of functions which is the attribute. 
Second, a sign that a set has its elements outside S is that we do not have names for its 
elements. The gas in the example is a case in point. 
Third, there may be a necessary relation between the properties of a complex surrogate 
and those of its elements. Examples are the average salary of employees in a set and the total 
amount of food (as opposed to the feeding cost) for a set of animals. We are not used to view-
ing these properties as properties of a set, because we usually compute them from the properties 
of the elements. But of course, they really are properties of the set of elements and not an indi-
vidual element. 
To keep track of the diversity of objects, we introduce names for the different ways in 
which an object may be structured. 
5 .1. 7. Definition 
1. An identity s is called primitive if s n S = 0 . s is called a set identity if s n S * 0 . 
2. s is called atomic if type (s) = 0. s is called aggregate if type (s) * 0. 
3. s is called compound if s ~ S x ... x S . 
An object is called primitive, set, aggregate, atomic, or compound if its identity is primitive, 
set, aggregate, atomic, or compound. A attribute is called primitive, set, aggregate, atomic, or 
compound if its values are primitive, set, aggregate, atomic, or compound. 0 
5.1.8. Definition 
The class of type t is the set of objects 
class(t) = {(x, a) I x E kind(t)l\a E states 1(x)}. D 
If the class is non-empty, kind (t) is a non-empty natural kind. The set kind (t) contains pre-
cisely the identities of the objects in class ( t). 
5.1.9. Definition 
The objects of a kind are 
obj(k) = {(x, a) I x E k, a E states(x)}. [] 
Obviously, the objects of a natural kind are the set 
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obj(k) class (type (k)). 
5.1.10. Definition 
The universe U is defined as the objects of kind S, 
U = {(x, a) I x E S 1\a E states(x)}. 0 
The universe thus contains for each surrogate x E S all objects whose identity is x and have a 
longest state vector meaningful for x. Note that in a strict sense, this is not the set of all possi-
ble objects. If (:X, a 0 ) E U, we may form an object (x, a 1) such that a 1 contains some, but 
not all components of a 0 . Then a 1 is not a longest state vector of x and (x , a 1) Ef U. 
5 .1.11. Definition 
Let o 1, o 2 E U. Then o 1 and o 2 are identical when id(o 1) 
guishable if st (o 1) =I= st (o0. 0 
id (o 2). o 1 and o 2 are distin-
Two objects are distinguishable if they are of different largest types, or if they are of the same 
largest type but have different values in their state vectors. The principle of Leibniz cited in 
section 3 .1.3 says that two objects are identical if they are indistinguishable. We there said that 
this principle cannot hold in a domain when the number if attributes is insufficient to distinguish 
different objects in all possible cases. We can now explicate the principle and its refutation pre-
cisely in terms of objects. Leibniz' principle says that 
Obviously, this implication is wholly contingent in our model, for we can have that 
id(o 1) =I= id(o 2)but 
st(o 1) = st (o 2). 
The converse of the principle of Leibniz says that identicals are indistinguishable, 
This principle cannot be adopted either when we work with possible worlds. In different possi-
ble worlds, the same object may occur in different states so that we can have that 
id(o 2) but 
In other words, we can talk about two different objects, o 1 -=f::. o 2 , which are identical, 
id(o 1) = id(o 2). 
5.2. State spaces and projection functions 
5 .2.1. Definition 
The t-state space of k ~ S is 
ST1 (k) = U states 1 (x). D 
x E k 
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Just as for individual identities, we want to restrict the t -state space of k to attributes applicable 
to all elements of k. That is, we take type (k) for t. This may be the empty set of attributes, 
though in general we consider natural kinds for which r'·.rye (k) * 0. 
5.2.2. Definition 
The state space of k ~ S is the set 
ST(k) = STrype<k>(k). D 
We need one more concept of state space, the state space ST of S. This is not the same as 
ST(S) but consists of all longest state vectors of all identities. In contrast, the set ST(S) con-
tains the state vectors containing values for attributes applicable to all identities. In most 
domains, ST(S) will be empty. 
5.2.3. Definition 
The state space of a domain is the set 
ST = U statesrype({x})(x). D 
X E s 
To show that all definitions are well-formed, we define projection functions between state 
spaces and prove that projections are commutative. 
5.2.4. Definition 
The projection 1r 1 1 : states 1 (s) ~ states 1 (s) is defined by 2 ! 2 ! 
(7rll (t))i =t -1 ') 
2 1 V, V, (I 
2 I 
for l E states 1/s) and i 
For example, let t 1 = {name}~ {emp#, name } 
v 1 :name -1, I 
v 1,: emp# -1 and 
v 1 : name -2. 2 
If u (2, Smith), then 
(u)v (name) 
'2 
(u) 2 
Smith. 
Thus, 1r 1 1 (u) 2 I (Smith), so that 1r 1 1 does what we expect it to do. 2 I 
Figure 7 illustrates the relevant mappings in the general case that t 1 ~ t 2 . The desired 
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{ I, ... , I t 
1 
/} {I, ... ,It 
2 
1J 
-1 
t 
2 
kind kind 
:2 
kind ( t ) kind ( t ) 
1 2 
STt STt 
1 2 
1r 
t 2 t 1 
4---------ST (kind ( t )) (2 2 ST (kind ( t )) (1 1 
Figure 7. 
property of the projection is that the bottom square of figure 7 is commutative. 
5.2.5. Theorem 
Let x E S and t 1 ~ t 2. Then 
7r 1 1 [states 1 (x)] = states 1 (x). 2 I 2 I 
Proof. 
Let n 1 = lk 1 1 and n 2 = lk 2 1 and xES. If t = (x' 1, ••• ,x'n) E statesk/x), then 
7r 1 1 (t) = (x' -t 1 , ••• , x' -1< 1 ) E statesk (x). 21 v 1 v 1 () v 1 v 1 ) 1 l ~ l 2 
Conversely, if (x 1, ••• ,xn) E statesk (x), then there is a l E stalesk (x) I I 2 with 
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1r 11 (t) = (x 1, ••• , x n ), for define t = (x' 1, ... , x' nJ with 2 1 1 2 
x'· J 
x'. J 
= x '-lU) if v 1 v; 1 (j)~n 1 , 
"r v t I 2 -
I 2 
arbitrary in range _1 .)(x) otherwise. D 
v r, U 
We can thus view a tuple as a tuple of different types and for each type project it to the suitably 
shortened tuple belonging to that type. The theorem can be extended easily to state spaces. 
5.2.6. Theorem 
7r 11 [ST1 (k)] = ST1 (k). ~ I 2 I 
Proof. 
7r 11 [ST1 (k)] = 7r 11 [ U states 1 (x)] 21 ' 21xEk 2 U 1r 11 [states 1 (x)] xEk 21 2 U states 1 (x) .t E k 1 STI(k). D I 
5.3. Worlds 
5.3.1. Definition 
Let w : S -+ ST. For each a , we define the function a w: dom (a) -+ S by 
aw(x) = 1rv (a)(w(x)),x E dom(a). D 
type{ (x }I 
1r v (a) simply projects the tuples in states (x) onto the component corresponding to attribute 
Npel (x }I 
a. 
A function w : S -+ ST assigns one state to each identity and is actually a set 
with the following to properties: 
1. All objects in the set have different identities; 
2. Each identity has exactly one state. 
After the addition of a construct which separates existing from nonexisting objects, a function w 
will be called a world. 
By the very choice of S as the set of actual and possible objects, we have committed our-
selves to the equivalent of an existence predicate in modal logic, an existence set. 13 To exist in 
w is to be element of the existence set of w . 
There are three ways to introduce existence sets m the current set-theoretical framework. 
The first is to let w be a partial function and declare dom ( w) to be the (identities of) existing 
objects. The second is to introduce an entity NE for "non-existent" and define w as a total 
function 
13. The reasons for introducl!lg an existence predicate in modal logic have been summarized neatly in 
Gamut [1982]. See also Hughes and Cresswell [10681. 
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S --+ ST U {NE } 
and declare w - 1(NE) to be the set on non-existing objects (we drop the tedious "identities of 
objects" from now on). The third solution is to introduce an object (em, a) called an existence 
monitor, whose state vector has only one component, which in each world is the set of existing 
objects in that world. 
In the first solution, w and a w are all partial functions. In the second, w is total but a w 
partial, and in the third, all functions are total. The first and third solutions are more coherent 
than the second, and the third also is in harmony to let the functions in each attribute (which 
now emerge as the functions a w) be total. We therefore opt for the third solution. 
Using a selected surrogate to monitor the existing surrogates will also turn out to be con-
venient when we define insertion and deletion of objects. These are state transitions in the life 
of the existence monitor, and not (or at least only marginally) in the life of the object inserted 
or deleted. Note that in the third solution, a w (x) has no meaning if x is not in the existence set 
and we must quantify, mostly, over the existence set instead of over S. 
A minor problem with the use of existence sets which emerges in all three solutions is that 
it cannot be described whether or not instantiated objects (objects whose identity is added to the 
existence set) have existed before. Therefore, we cannot npress integrity constraints which for-
bid reincarnation. This is· a minor problem, for it can easily be solved by working with. two 
sets, containing present and past objects. This does not provide us any new insights, so we do 
not follow this route here. Moreover, in a future report we will introduce histories by defining 
objects as pairs (s, h), where h is a sequence of state vectors containing the history of s. Dele-
tion will then be represented by the addition of a final tuple to the history. The existence set 
will then contain all present and past objects, and present objects are then defined as objects 
whose identities are in the existence set and whose histories are not yet finished. The necessary 
distinctions can thus be made using a single existence set and here we anticipate upon this 
future extension. 
A major problem with all three solutions is that a basic principle of set theory is that, 
"given a collection M of mathematical objects, subcollections are themselves perfectly reason-
able mathematical objects, as are collections of these new objects, and so on." (Barwise [1975], 
p. 7) If to be a reasonable mathematical object is to exist, we are in trouble, for the existence 
set (set?) of a world then becomes very large. And in the current Platonic view, it is perfectly 
reasonable to say that abstract objects exist, independently of human observation, if they are 
reasonable mathematical objects. (Bernays [1935] regards the view that mathematical objects 
exist independently of the reflecting subject as the hallmark of Platonism.) Each existence set 
would then in effect be a model of axiomatic set theory. Obviously, we must cut this route 
short, or the specifi~ation of database updates will become unmanagebly infinite. For example, 
if we delete an object o from the existence set, we would have to delete all objects in which o 
occurs, and in in the set-theoretical universe there are in general nondenumerably infinitely 
many of these. 
We therefore view the existence set not so much as the collection of objects which exists, 
but which is actual as opposed to possible. And to be actual will be defined below as to be the 
value of an attribute (or to be an element of an actual object). In other words, if in w a project 
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has membersw = {e 0, e 1, e 2 }, then only that set is said to exist, but if s0 = {eo, e d is not a 
value of any attribute, then s0 is said not to exist. On the other hand, because {e 0 , e 1, e 2 } 
exists, e 0 , e 1 and e 2 are required to exist as well. We now formalize these ideas. 
5.3.2. 
We add the following axioms for the constants ext and em to I: 5 and I: A : 
em EE S, 
ext = [{em}-+ .jT(S)]. 
I: A also contains uniqueness axioms for ext (see appendix 3). The reason for demanding that 
em EE S will become clear in a moment. 
To be able to talk about ext.,..(em) as the value of ext in w, we consider functions 
w : S U {em } -+ ST. For each such function we can then t~lk of the identities which exist in w, 
ext . ..,(em). Each of these identities has a state w(x) in w. Non-existing identities also have a 
state, but this is not relevant for these are never used. 
5.3.3. Definition 
Let w ~ U be a function S U {em} -+ ST with w (x) E states (x). w is called a world if it 
satisfies the following existence requirements: 
1. aw[ext.,..(em)ndom(a)]~ext.,..(em) and 
2. Vx E extw(em)[x ns = x next.,..(em)]. 
3. extw(em)nsn~(extw(em))n. 
The set of all functions satisfying these requirements is called the set PW of possible worlds. 
We use 
as metavariables over the set of possible words. 0 
The first requirement says that attribute values of ex1stmg aggregate objects exist. If these 
values have themselves attributes, their values are required to exist as well, etc. 
The second requirement demands that the elements of existing set identities exist as well. 
If those elements are set identities, then their elements are required to exist as well, etc. 
The third requirement demands that the components of existing tuple identities exist as 
well. Like the other two, this demand is recursive. 
These requirements are the translation of referential integrity constraints from relational 
theory into a set-theoretical framework. 
If we would have demanded that em E S, then requirement 1 would have implied that 
extw[ext.,..ndom(ext)]~extw(em). If em EE ext.,..(em), this is true, but if em E ext.,..(em) 
(which is allowed), it reduces to 
ext.,..[{em }]~ext.,..(em), 
which implies ext w (em) E ext w (em). This violates regularity. There are two ways to avoid 
this, either by demanding that em EE ext .,.(em) fur all w, or hy demanding that em EE S. We 
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have chosen the second way, though nothing much hinges on the choice between one rather than 
the other of these two options. 
5.3.4. 
Note that we do not demand that ext w (em) be the smallest set satisfying the existence require-
ments. To see why we do not do this, recall that atomic objects have a zero-length state vector, 
but may contain elements, i.e. be sets (see definition 5.1.7). In our example, the set 
members w (p) is atomic, for no attribute applies to it. 
If ext w (em) were the smallest set satisfying the existence requirements, then we would 
have to explicitly describe the addition and deletion of atomic objects according to whether 
they become or cease to be attribute values or elements of existing objects. But we do not like 
to describe the addition and deletion of a natural number every time it becomes and ceases to 
be an attribute value or element of an existing object. Moreover, in a Platonic view atomic 
objects should always be in the existence set, for unchangable objects exist eternally. 
Socrates - "So then, are not the compounded and the composite naturally liable to be 
composed in the same way in which they were put together? And if there is anything 
uncompounded is not that, if anything, naturally immune to decomposition?" 14 
We could therefore add the requirement that all atomic obje~ts be in the existence set, 
4. type(x) = 0 =H E extw(em). 
But now we have invited the vast set-theoretical universe back into the existence set, for all sets 
to which no attributes apply are atomic. This may not be a problem, for no updates have to be 
specified for these sets (they have no attributes to be updated), but it does not sit comfortably 
next to the frugality with which we decided to manage the existence of non-atomic objects. So 
let us restrict 4 to our version of Urelemente: 
4'. type(x) = 01\x ns = 0 =H E extw(em). 
But now we have excluded too much from the existence set, for if rN ~ S, 
Vn E rN [(n +1) ns = n]. We end up with only 0 being the identity of an eternally existent 
object. 15 As a last resort, we can simply demand ad hoc that any sort we please be in ext w (em), 
e.g. rN ~ext w (em) if the domain contains natural numbers. If we choose this kludge, we must 
tailor the definition of worlds to the particular domain theory we are working with by adding 
requirements sn ~ext w (em) for S?rt names sn, and can then demand that ext w (em) be the 
smallest set satisfying the existence requirements. Although this alternative seems workable, we 
prefer to leave the options open as long as we can, which is why we omitted any reference to it 
in the definition of worlds. 
14. Plato, Phaedo par. 788. This is similar to the view expressed by Leibni? in his Monadology cited ear-
lier. 
15. From a Buddhistic standpoint, this is the correct view to take. 
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5.4. Extensions 
5.4.1. Definition 
The extension of a kind k in world w is the set 
kw = k nextw(em). 
The extension of a type t in w is the extension of its kind in w, 
The definition clearly distinguishes the kind of a type from its extension. "Kind" is an inten-
sional concept, whereas extension is an extensional concept. Each type determines the same 
kind in all possible worlds, but its extension depends upon the state of the world. 
Note that we use the same symbol, ext w, to denote the attribute of em and the extension of 
a type in w. 
Not all properties of kinds are inherited by extensions. We are interested, first, in the pro-
perties that are inherited and second, in the properties of an extension which can tell us some-
thing about the kinds of which it is an extension. The following list of theorems compares each 
property of kinds with the corresponding property of extensions. The list is followed by a sum-
mary of the answers to these two questions. 
We use the following two basic facts about extensions. 
k 141 ~k 
type (k) ~type (k w). 
The first follows from the definition of k w and the second follows from the first. 
The left column of each theorem gives the theorem for kinds corresponding to the 
theorems for extensions in the right column. The numbers of the theorems for kinds are added. 
5.4.2. Theorem 
1. (4.1.4.1) kind(0) = S ext,.,(0) = ext,.,(em) 
2. (4.1.4.3) kind (t) = n 
a E I 
dom(a) ext.,. (t) = n 
a E I 
ext 141 ({a}) 
ext.,. (t) ~ n dom(a) 
u E I 
3. (4.1.4.4) k ~kind(t) ¢} t ~ type(k) k.,. ~ ext"' ( t) ¢} t ~ type ( k"') 
4. ( 4. 1 .4. 5) t 1 ~ t 2 ~kind (l 2) ~kind (t 1) t 1 ~ t 2 ~ ext.,. ( t 2) ~ ext.,. (t 1) 
5. (4.1.4.6) k 1 ~ k 2 ~type (k 2) ~type (k 1) k, ~k2 ~type(k 2 )~type(k 1 ) 
" 
. w w 
Proof 
and 2 are trivial. For 3, note that by definition. ext.,..(t)~kind(t), so 
t ~type (kind (t)) ~type (ext,.. (t)). 
Then 
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k.,., ~ext w (t) =>type (ext.,., (t)) ~type (k.,.,) => t ~type (k.,.,). 
For the other half we use 4.1.5.2 to note that 
k.,., ~kind(type(k.,.,)), so 
k.,., nextw(em)?;:kind(type(kw)) nextw(em), so 
k.,.,~ext.,.,(type(kw)). 
Therefore, 
t ~type (k w) =>ext.,., (type (k w)) ~ e.:d"' (t) => k,.,?;: ext.,., (t)). 
In this proof we used 4 and 5, which are proved independently. 
4. t 1 ?i: t 2 =>kind (t2) next ,.,(em)~ kind (t 1) next wCem). 
5. 4.1.4.6 is a general statement for all kinds. D 
Thus, all parts of theorem 4.1.4 can be relativized to worlds. This means that generalization 
relations are invariant in all possible worlds. For example, 3 says that if all existing truck 
drivers in w are employees in w, then all employee attributes are applicable to truck drivers, 
and vice versa. 4 says that specialization indices the same subset hierarchy in every possible 
world. 
5.4.3. Theorem 
4.1.5.1 t ~type (kind (t)) t~type(ext.,.,(t)) 
4.1.5.2 k ~kind (type (k)) k w ~ext,.. (type (k w)) 
Proof. 
This has been proven in 3 above. D 
The definition of natural kinds has a pleasing consequence for extensions of a natural kind, as is 
shown in the next theorem. 
5.4.4. Theorem 
Proof. 
1. " = kind (rype (k)) i:.,., = extw(rype(i: .... )) 
2. I= type(kind(t)) -
kw~k=> 
kind(type(i: ,.,))~kind(type(i:)) => 
kind (type (i: ,.,)) ~ i: => 
kind(type(k ,.,)) next,.,(em)?;:i: next.,.,(em) => 
extw(rype(i:,.,))'ii:iw. D 
To give a counterexample of 1 = rype(extw(l)), let 1 0 = rype(Emp), then in w 0 the extension 
of l 0 may happen to consist only of truck drivers. Then the type of this extension is larger than 
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type(Emp). 
As an illustration of 1, if i. 0 is the extension of the natural kind of employees in world w 0 , 
then type (i. 0) is a superset of type (Emp). The cases where the existing employees are all of a 
genuine subkind of Emp -for example, if they all employees in i. 0 truck drivers- are precisely 
the cases where type (Emp) C type (i. 0). But even if we don't know what smallest natural kind 
i. 0 is an extension of, we do know that the current extension of that natural kind is k 0 . 
This equality fails for unnatural kinds. For example, take a domain where employees are 
either secretary or engineer or truck driver and let k 1 be the set currently existing secretaries 
and engineers. The type of k 1 is the type of employees, and the extension of that type includes 
the currently existing secretaries and engineers as well as the currently existing truck drivers, so 
that 
Theorem 4.1 .7 says that a type is a natural type iff it is the type of a set of identities, so that an 
easy test whether a type is natural is to see if it is the set of all attributes applicable to a set of 
existing identities k w in an arbitrary world w . Though we are guaranteed to find only natural 
types in this way, the counterexample above shows that we will in general not find all natural 
types in this way. 
5.4.5. Theorem 
1. (4.1.8.3) kind(t)fi:.k ¢>type(i.)fi:_l type (k) fiE I~ ext w (I) fiE* w 
2. (4.1.8.4) k 1 fiE'- 2 ¢>type (i. 2) fiE type (i. 1) kl fiE k 2 ¢>type (i. 2 ) fiE type (k 1 
w w 
3. (4.1.8.5) I J fi:_ 1 2 ¢>kind (I 2) fi:_ kind ( 1 1) -
Proof. 
1. type('-w)fi=l~ ext .... (t)fi:_extw(type(i,..)) = i-.,.. 
2. type(i. 1)fi:.type(i- 2 ) ~ extw(type(i. 1 ))~ext,.(type(k 2 )) ~ i- 1 .~'- z.,: 0 
To show that 
extw(t 2)~extw(l 1 ) :,P 
~~~ lz, 
take the case that 
ext,. ( {emp# }) ~ext,. ( {emp#, licence#}), but 
{ emp#, Licence# } <t { emp# } . 
) 
w 
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5.4.6. Theorem 
1. (4.1.10.1) k is a natural kind iff 
type(k) = type(k')~k'~k 
2. (4.1.10.2) t is a natural type iff 
kind (t) = kind (t') "'* t' ~ t 
Proof. 
If k is a natural kind, then 
type(k.,..) = type(k' .,..) "'* 
ext.,..(type(k.,..)) = ext.,..(type(k' .,..)) ~ 
kw = extw(type(k'w))~ 
k'w~k.,... 0 
If k is a natural kind 
then 
type(k.,..) = type(k'.,..)=*k'.,..~kw 
-
A counterexample to the converse of 1 is a world w where 
k.,.. is the set of actual secretaries and engineers, and 
all actual employees are secretaries or engineers. 
Then type (k w) = type (k 'w) only if k' w is a set a some actual secretaries or engineers, so 
But k w is not the extension of a natural kind. 
Nothing can be proved in the case of 2. Take for example a world in which all and only 
the actual temporary employees are secretaries. These have natural types and equal extensions, 
but neither is contained in the other. Conversely, two arbitrary attribute sets, one of which is 
contained in the other, may have empty extensions in a world. Then 
kind(t) = kind(t')=*t'~t, 
but neither type is natural. 
5.4.7. Theorem 
Proof. 
Immediate. 0 
1. (4.2.2.1) 
2. (4.2.2.2) 
n kind ( t i ) = kind ( u l i ) 
. . 
I I 
u kind ( l i ) ~ kind ( n t i ) 
I I 
n ext w ( l i ) = ext w ( u t i ) 
I I 
u ext w ( t i) ~ ext w ( n t i) 
I I 
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5.4.8. 
Instead of looking at the identities of existing objects, as we have done up till now, we can also 
study their states. For example, the states of existing objects of kind k are the set w [k w]. This 
set contains for each identity in k w its longest state vector. Viewed as a set of objects, 
w [k w] ~ w. For a natural kind, w [.k w] is the analogon in the current object-oriented framework 
of the relation instance of relational theory. 
Let w * (x) be w (x) padded with NA 's to give it the length I A I . Then w *[ext w (em)] is 
the set of A -vectors of all existing objects. Viewed as a set of objects, it corresponds to the 
universal relation instance of relational theory. A comparison with relational theory is done in 
section 7. 1 . 
The projection theorem 5.2.6 can be relativized to the state sets of existing objects. 
5.4.9. Theorem 
If [ I ~ t 2' 11" t ,r 
1 
[ 11" A , I) W * [ k w ]]] 
Proof. 
Ommitted. 0 
The set 11" A 1 [ w * [k w ]] is the set of t z-vectors of identities in /,.."; the set 11" A 1 [w * [k w ]] is the set 
' 2 ' I 
of t 1-vectors of the same identities. Obviously, 11" 1 1 projects the one onto the other. 2 I 
5.4.10. 
We now summarize the answers to the two questions 
1. Which properties of kinds are inherited by their extensions and 
2. Which properties of natural kinds can we deduce from those> of their extensions. 
We found that the kind and type lattices are preserved by extensions and that the type- and 
extension lattices are each other's inverse. Together with the relativization of 4.2.2, this means 
that in each world the extensions of the types in each specialization group are disjoint and form 
a partition if the specialization group is exhaustive. 
The criteria for natural kinds in terms of their extensions are purely negative, i.e. they are 
of the form 
If k is a natural kind, then cf>(k). 
Using this, we can only show definitively that something is not a natural kind. We found three 
negative criteria: 
1. .k.,., = type(ext.,.,(.k.,.,)). 
2. type(i- 2 )~type(/: I )~/:I ~i 2 ... · 
"' w -
3. type(J..,.,) = type(k'.,.,)~k'w~*w· 
The only positive criterion is that if t is the type of any set of existing identities, then kind (t) is 
a natural kind. There i:> no criterion to find out whether a type is natural, i.e. whether we have 
found all attributes applicable to a natural kind. 
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Chapter 6 
Static integrity constraints 
6.1. Admissible worlds and the language L 5 (CON, L) 
6.1.1. 
The set PW can now be used as a supplier of models for static integrity constraints expressed in 
L 5 (CON). A static constraint like "A project must have at least one member" can be expressed 
in L 5 (CON) as x E Project,.,[membersw(x) =I= 0]. This is an open wff which is satisfied by 
some w E PW. Those worlds which satisfy the static integrity constraints are called admissible 
worlds. Definitions follow below. 
To get a feeling of the status of PW and the integrity constraints, consider a classification 
of physical laws given by van Fraassen [1970]. 
"In the case of a nonrelativistic theory, the function of a law is to describe the 
behavior of the kind of physical system with which the theory deals: to describe the 
possible states of which it is capable, its normal evolution through time when undis-
turbed, and its behavior in interaction. We shall therefore proceed in accordance 
with the traditional threefold distinction between laws of coexistence, laws of succes-
sion, and laws of interaction. (p. 330) 
Of each of these, there are statistical and nonstatistical versions. Van Fraassen continues: 
"Laws of coexistence select the physically possible subset of the state-space ... Laws of sucession 
select the physically possible trajectories in the state-space." (p. 330-331) Laws of interaction 
describe how a system behaves when it is aggregated with other systems into a larger system. 
Examples are the familiar Boyle-Charles gas law PV = RT (law of coexistence), the classical 
p = m. q (law of succession) and the composition of laws describing individual particles in 
many-body systems (law of interaction). 
Obviously, van Fraassen 's laws of coexistence are the static integrity constraints of data-
base domain modelling and laws of succession and interaction are dynamic constraints. We 
psotpone dynamic constraints to a forthcoming report and concentrate now on static constraints. 
6.1.2. Definition 
A wff ¢( w) containing w as only free variable is called a static integrity constraint. Let IC ( w) 
be a conjunction of wff's containing w as only free variable. Then the set AM of admissible 
worlds selected by IC is 
AM= {w E PW I JC(w)}. D 
In order to formulate the static constraints easily, we extend L 0 with the description operator. 
The resulting language is called L SC CON). 
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6.1.3. Definition 
The tenns of L 5 (CON, t) are defined as follows. 
I. If t is an individual variable or constant, t is a term. 
2. If x is an individual variable and¢ a wff, LX[¢] is a term. 0 
The new syntax is given an interpretation as follows. 
6.1.4. Definition 
/(tx[¢]) =si if 3i EN 3!x E S[<t>(x)] 1\x =si 
0 otherwise. 0 
Thus, 0 plays the role of the distinguished element in the domain which indicates absence. 
Note that LX [ ¢] is regarded as being absent if there is more than one x with ¢. 
The inference rules of L 5 (CON, t) are the same as those for L 5 (CON). 
6.2. Examples 
6.2.1. 
Static constraints can be classified into three groups. Existence constraints demand that an 
object exists (or does not exist), uniqueness constraints demand that precisely one object exists, 
and coexistence constraints demand that certain objects exist in combination. We treat these in 
order. 
6.2.2. Existence constraints 
The most basic existence constraints have been built into our concept of a possible world, that 
the components of existing compound objects exist. Attribute values of existing aggregates, ele-
ments of existing sets, and components of existing tuples are required to exist. Thus, com-
ponents are essential to compound objects in that they must exist in all possible worlds in which 
the compound exists. 
The three existence requirements for possible worlds are examples of a type of existence 
constraint which requires the existence of components. Let us call these constraints of required 
existence. There are other required existence constraints. For example, the three basic 
existence requirements guarantee that existing projects have existing project members and that 
existing tasks are tasks of existing employees and projects: 
members= [Project---+ r.J>(Emp)] 
task = [Emp xProject ---+ TASKS]. 
But we want to impose the additional constraint that only employee, project) pairs exist for 
which (employee E members.,., (project). This constraint can be formulated thus: 
V(x, y) E (Emp x Project) next w (em )[x E members., (y)] (ICI) 
Note that a required component may be 0. If this is disallowed, that constraint must be 
added to /C. We may call such a constraint a presence constraint. An example is 
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Vx E Projectw[membersw(x) * 0]. (IC2) 
The requirement that all permanent employees have a name is expressed as 
(IC3) 
A dual to the required existence of components is the dependent existence of a component. 
x E S is said to have dependent existence in w iff 
x E extw(em)~ 3y E extw(em) 3a[x = aw(Y)]. 
For example, we may declare actresses to have dependent existence. An address then ceases to 
exist if there is no existing bearer of the address. 
Although existence constraints are easy to formulate, we may expect them to play havoc 
with the correct specification of update procedures. Think for a moment what is involved in the 
deletion of objects from a world in connection with each of the types of existence constraint. 
Furtado et al. [1981] give a detailed analysis of a specification of updates which is correct with 
respect to one simple existence constraint, which requires atribute values to exist if the aggre-
gate exists. 
6.2.3. Uniqueness constraints 
Uniqueness constraints can be expressed simply by defining the attributes to be sets of 1-1 func-
tions. An example is 
emp# = [Emp --+ 1- 1 EMP##]. 
Other examples can be found in appendix 3. These uniqueness constraints are thus not part of 
the definition of AM but of PW. There is no metaphysics in this, just convenience. 
Uniqueness constraints are a generalization of the concept of key from relational theory. 
Note that employee numbers, licence numbers, etc. are only required to be unique in each pos-
sible world; they need not be so across possible worlds. Two employees can swap employee 
numbers from one possible world to the next and still respect the uniqueness constraint for 
emp#. 
A more refined example of a uniqueness constraint is the constraint that in one project, 
each employee has a unique task: 
Vx E Projectw[taskw: members 141 (x)x{x} --+ 1- 1 TASKS] (IC4) 
Still another example is that each project has exactly one leader: 
Vx E Projectw 3 !y E membersw(x)[task 141 (y, x) =leader]. (IC5) 
6.2.4. Coexistence constraints 
All other constraints on possible worlds are lumped together under the term "coexistence con-
straints." An example is the requirement that each project has at least three members: 
Vx E Projectw[lmembersw(x) I >2]. (IC6) 
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As an example of the use of the description operator, assume that IC 5 holds, so that 
a [task w (x, y) = leader] has the semantics "the leader of project x in world w." Suppose that 
the attribute 
salary = [Emp - IN ] 
has been defined and that we have a function 
avg: CP( fN) - IR 
which computes the average of a set of natural numbers. (If arithmetic is only defined for 
natural numbers, use truncation or rounding and/or multiply the numbers with powers of ten so 
that we can work solely with natural numbers.) Then the constraint that the average salary of 
project members does not exceed the salary of the project leader is 
Vx E Project w [avg (salary w [members wCx)]) ~ salary w(LY [taskw(Y, x) = leader]]. (IC7) 
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Chapter 7 
Comparison with other approaches 
7 .1. Some problems from philosophical logic 
7.1.1. 
The treatment of set theory in the language of modal logic is a minefield through which one has 
to tread very carefully. PW can serve as a Kripke model for a theory containing S5 axioms 
expressed in a modal language, i.e. one containing operators forD ("it is necessary that ... ") 
and () ("it is possible that ... "). The interpretation of Oct> is that ct> is true in all possible 
worlds, whereas ()cp is true iff 1> is true in at least one possible world (see Hughes & Cresswell 
[1968] for details). When the _static constraints are expressed in such a language, the set AM of 
admissible worlds is then simply a Kripke model which satisfies the theory consisting of the 
integrity constraints and the S5 axioms. 
More in detail, the language L 5 (CON, <),extended with operators D and 0, would have 
to be interpreted by assigning an interpretation to E which is independent of the current 
world, because otherwise we would not be working in a single model for ZF anymore. In the 
extreme case, each possible world would be a model for ZF. 
The attribute names would have to be introduced as function symbols, not as constants, 
and each attribute name £! is interpreted in w as a w. Natural kind names are constants which 
receive the same interpretation in each possible world 
We will not define a modal language for integrity constraints in detail, for there are a 
number of conceptual problems in S5 logics which are absent from the formulation of con-
straints in L 5 (CON, <). We briefly discuss some of these problems below. 
7.1.2. 
A well-known problem in S5 is that 
x =y ~ocx =y) (1) 
is a theorem. Using this theorem (and using attribute names as function names, as indicated 
above), we would have 
members(x) = members(y) ~D(members(x) = members(v)). 
In words, if two projects have the same set of members, they necessarily have the same set of 
members. But if two projects have the same set of members, they need not have so in all possi-
ble worlds, so this consequence is counterintuitive. In L 5 (CON), however, the equivalent of 
( 1) is 
x =y ~ Vw[x =y] (2) 
and this is obviously valid. If two variables refer to the same set, they do so independently of 
the world we are in. And from (2) we are not allowed to infer 
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members w (x) = members w (y) ~ Vw [members w (.r) = members w (y)], 
for the quantifier now captures one of the free variables in the terms substituted for x and y . 
By quantifying explicitly over worlds, the paradoxes involved in (1) are avoided. 
Kripke's (1971], [1980] solution to (1) is to treat constants as rigid designators, i.e. as 
names which refer to the same identity in every possible world. We effectively did so by 
naming the elements of S by IN (using the function s i, giving a name to the set of possible 
intepretations of a function, and by interpreting natural kind names rigidly. (See Quine ( ... ] 
..... for the reasons for interpreting natural kind nam~s rigidly). 
Note also that we allow for arbitrary differences in the states of objects across possible 
worlds. The problem of trans-world identification is "solved" by simply declaring it to be 
solved: The capability to talk of a different state of the same object in different possible worlds 
presupposes our ability to identify two objects as being two manifestations of an identical 
object. 
7.1.3. 
A problem which is related to (1) is that descriptions may not be substituted freely for x in 
Vx[¢(x)] if <P contains a modal operator. For example, let !ose(x) be the set of losers of game 
x and winner(x) be the winner of game x. Then V elimination would lead to the inference 
VyO(y E lose(x)) 
() (winner (x) E .lose (x)). 
It is true that the winner could have lost in another possible world, but it is not true that there is 
a world in which the winner of x is in the set of losers of x. Here, too, the paradox disappears 
in L 5 (CON, L) . From 
Vy 3 w [y E lose w (x)] 
we cannot infer 
Vy 3w[winnerw(Y) E losew(x)], 
for the free variable w in winner w (x) is captured by the quantifier. 
These problems can be avoided in S5 by sharpening the inference rules of the logic (see 
for example Kutschera (1976]). Application to integrity constraints for admissible worlds is a 
complex matter which will have to wait future research. 
7 .2. Universal relation models 
7.2.1. 
Before we can compare the domain axiomatization proposed in this report with other 
approaches to domain models, we must clear up a terminological problem which obscures a fun-
damental difference between the approach in this report and other approaches. 
In speaking of data models, we use the term "model" in a way different from the ways we 
have used the term in this report. 
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1. The first meaning in which we have used "model" is idealization or simplification or 
abstraction. In this sense, the domain is a model of the UoD and the DB a model of the 
implementation (figure 1). 16 
2. The second meaning of "model" in this report is the Tarskian sense of the word which is 
now standard in predicate logic. In this sense, the domain is a model for an uninterpreted 
formal language, L 5 . 
3. In "data model," "model" occurs in a third sense, which can perhaps best be described as 
class of structures which can be found in the database. 
It is important to realize that the third meaning differs in two respects from the second meaning. 
First, it concerns the database, not the domain, and second, it concerns a class of database 
structures, not a particular database. When we talk of the relational model or the RM/T model, 
we use "model" in the third sense. To have a name for the datamodel (third sense) developed 
in this report, we call it ABSURD, for ABStract Surrogate Domain. 
Because a database is a representation of an infinite domain in a finite machine, we may 
expect a number of structures in databases which are a peculiarity of the finiteness of the data-
base and do not occur in the domain itself. This expectation will be confirmed when we com-
pare database models with ABSURD. For example, in the database we will have to choose 
between storing or computing attribute values whereas in the domain, there is no difference 
between these two. If we choose to compute a value in the database, the database will have to 
support virtual tables and this in its turn entails some decision about the possibility (and seman-
tics) of view updates. If on the other hand we choose to store a value, then we must decide in 
which relation instance(s) it should be stored. If it is stored in more than one instance, then 
some sort of referential integrity maintenance must be decided upon. Virtual tables, relational 
decomposition and referential integrity between tables are database concepts, not domain con-
cepts. 
7.2.2. 
Universal relation (UR) models have been proposed or criticized, among others, by Atzeni & 
Parker [1982], Biskup & Bruggemann [1983], Maier, Rozenshtein & Warren [1983], Maier, Ull-
man & Vardi [1984], Ullman [1982]. We first summarize the central idea and then compare it 
with ABSURD. 
In UR models, the user of the database can view the database as a single relation called 
the universal relation. A tuple in a UR instance may contain many null values, but since the 
UR is, in general, not actually stored, these nulls are not stored either. Rather, the database 
allows the use to ask queries as if the UR were stored, thus freeing the user of "logical naviga-
tion," i.e. the specification of which attributes belong to which DB relation. Each attribute 
occurs only once in the UR, so that the user is also freed of remembering which attributes in 
different DB relations are the same and which are different. 
ABSURD shares a number of assumptions with UR models, notably the unique name 
16. The relation between the domain and the UoD is the converse of the relation between the DB and the 
implementation. The domain describes the UoD. whereas the DB prescribes what the implementation should 
implement. 
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assumption, which says that each attribute has a unique name whose intuitive meaning it is to 
refer to the same role in each possible context. 
UR models also know the relationship uniqueness assumption, which says that, given an 
arbitrary database stated, there is a unique relation instance [X](d) for each attribute set X. In 
ABSURD, we also make this assumption, but with a difference. For each t ~A we have 
defined a single set kind (t), but for some types this set is empty. What we are interested in is 
the extensions of natural kinds in a world, and these are precisely the kinds of types t for which 
kind (t) is not empty. 
Maier et al. [1984] mention a third assumption which they call the one flavor assumption 
and which says that the "real world significance" of the tuples in [X](d) is independent of the 
access path used to compute that relation instance. We do not make this assumption in 
ABSURD, because it concerns not the domain, but the implementation of the DB. In the (Pla-
tonic) domain, there. is no difference between storage and computation. But as a statement 
about the implementation of the DB, it is not so much an assumption as a requirement for the 
implementation. 
The following is a list of differences between the ABSURD approach and UR models. 
1. Level of abstraction. The UR is an abstraction from the database, not from the domain. 
The reason why UR theory has "not been picked up, explicitly, by builders of real systems 
(as opposed to prototypes)" (Ullman [1987], p. 5) may be that it is not natural for the user 
to view the data in the DB as an instance of one huge relation. Instead, they may find it 
more natural to look at an abstraction of the UoD, the domain, through the spectacles 
which the DB provides. As Atzeni & Parker [1982] (p. 1) remark, 
In making assumptions (such as the uni versa! relation assumption) more for establishing certain 
results (such as the usefulness of 'decomposition' as a design methodology) than for their appropri-
ateness in modelling data, one must realize that the results may not be useful to database engineers. 
The user as well as the database engineer want to view the domain in terms of structures 
natural to the domain, instead of the database in terms of structures which give rise to neat 
theorems. 
2. Relation between domain and database. Much of UR theory has to do with the seman-
tics of the stored DB relation instances in terms of a hypothetical UR instance. This 
corresponds to the relation between the DB and the domain in ABSURD. UR research 
has, in my opinion, picked up the stick at the wrong end; instead of starting with the inves-
tigation of the domain structures which a DB should represent, it started with the proper-
ties of a representation without being clear about what should be represented. 
3. Null values. One UR instance corresponds roughly to the set w *[ext,.. (em)], which is the 
set of pairs (x, a) where x is an existing identity and a is the current A -state vector of x. 
a will contain NA 's at places corresponding to inapplicable attributes. Now, in the 
domain, all values in a will be known, whereas in the DB, some may be unknown. 
Whereas in the domain we distinguish 0 from NA , in the DB we will have to add another 
type of null value, .l, representing ··unknown.·· The UR model does not distinguish these 
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different types of null values. 
To illustrate the difference in the treatment of null values in UR models and in ABSURD, 
we translate an example given by Maier et al. [1984] in ABSURD. The example DB state is 
represented by the three relation instances 
emp 
Jones 
Jones 
child 
Ann 
Jim 
Green Sue 
emp 
Jones 
Smith 
dept 
Shoes 
Toys 
Table 1. 
dept mgr 
Toys Green 
Taking the natural join and chasing the dependencies given by Maier et al. (not listed 
here) leads to the UR instance 
emp child dept mgr 
Jones Ann Shoes 
..Lz 
Jones Jim Shoes 
..Lz 
Green Sue 
..Ls j_6 
Jones j_7 Shoes j_2 
Smith j_9 Toys Green 
j_ II .1.. 12 Toys Green 
Table 2. 
To represent this example in ABSURD, we can either use our intuitions concerning the 
UoD represented by table 1 and represent those in an ABSURD model, or we can try to 
translate table 1 itself as faithfully into ABSURD as possible_. For fairness of comparison, 
we choose the second option, even though we do not utilize the full expressive capability 
of ABSURD to describe the UoD. The following attribute axioms are then appropriate: 
name = [Emp U Child UDept-+ NAMES] 
children = [Emp -+ 6'(Child)] 
dept = [Emp -+ Dept] 
mgr = [Dept -+ Emp ]. 
In a more accurate UoD abstraction, we would have introduced the natural kind Person 
and defined children as [Person -+ 6'(Person)]. This would have necessitated a decision 
about the value of children (Ann), since Ann is a Person (who in table 1 is only recorded 
as a child). Figure 8 shows the generalization, aggregation and set hierarchies involved. 
To translate table 2 into ABSURD, we are faced with the problem that Smith, who is an 
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children 
Emp 
mgr NAMES 
Dept 
Figure 8. 
employee, is recorded as having J.. 9 children. It is not clear whether this means "unk-
nown number of children" or "no children". Similar remarks hold for the J.. 2 manager of 
the shoes department. Assuming that Smith has no children and shoes has no manager, 
we get table 3. 
identity name children dept 
e t Jones {p,,p2} d, 
ez Green {p 3} dz 
e3 Smith 0 d') 
Pt Ann NA NA 
P2 Jim NA NA 
P3 Sue NA NA 
d, shoes NA NA 
dz toys NA NA 
Table 3. 
The left hand .,ide of table 3 is extw(em). For example, 
ext w(Emp) = {e 1, e 2, e3} 
ext.,.,.(Child) = {p l• pz, P3} 
ext.,.,.(Dept) = {d 1, d 2 }. 
mgr 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
0 
ez 
The right hand side of table 3 1s the set STA (ext ... (em)) ,.. , the set of A -state vectors of 
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existing identities. The state of existing identities results when we project an A -vector on 
type (x). Thus, 
w(e 1) (Jones, {p 1,p 2 }, d 1) and 
w ( d 0 = (toys , e 2) . 
Note the following things about table 3. 
3.1. Each tuple represents a meaningful domain object, because the identity of the object 
about which the attributes give information is represented. Compare this with the 
tuples in table 2, where no such subject of information is singled out (the attributes in 
table 2 occur in arbitrary order). 
3 .2. There is only one NA value in table 3, not distinguished by an index. This expresses 
the fact that there is only one kind of inapplicability. Much of the indexing of nulls 
in table 2 is thus superfluous. 
3.3. Although the UR model is supposed to handle null values, it cannot distinguish the 
case where an attribute value is unknown from the case where it is positively known 
that it there is no component present. In ABSURD, there is no incomplete 
knowledge at the domain level and we can use 0 to denote absence. In the DB, we 
can expect some of the definite values in table 3 to be replaced by ..L . 
Some other differences between ABSURD and the UR approach are really difference between 
ABSURD and the relational approach in general and will be treated in the next subsection. 
7.2.3. 
A fundamental difference between the ABSURD model and relational models is that in rela-
tional models, an attribute is 
1 . a set of entities as well as 
2. a role which these entities play (see Beeri & Korth [1982] for a clear statement of this 
view). 
This leads to possible confusions when the entities "in an attribute" play different roles. For 
example, an Emp may play the roles of a project leader, chief engineer, father, and manager 
in the same database. If we would use the same name for the entity set Emp as for the 
appropriate attribute in Project, Working- group, Family and Dept, we would neglect to give a 
name to these different roles in different environments; but if we would give each attribute an 
intuitively satisfying name, we would neglect the fact that these attributes have the same under-
lying "domain." By distinguishing attributes from attribute ranges, these distinctions can be 
expressed. 
The ABSURD concept of attribute has the advantage that several related assumptions can 
be distinguished, viz. the unique role, unique attribute name and unique attribute range assump-
tions. These assumptions say that 
1. The functions in an attribute belong together in that they formalize the same role, indepen-
dent of the identities to which they currently happen to apply, 
2. Different attributes have different names and each attribute has the same name m each 
world, and that 
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3. Each attribute draws its values from the ·same set of possible identities in each world. 
Separation of entity from role can only be done when we have a way of naming entities in a 
attributeless, neutral way. This is done by ABSURD. Use of identities has another advantage. 
that of no-duplication. Whereas within a relation instance key values are not duplicated, 
between relation instances they are, e.g. as referential keys. By using identities we avoid this 
at the conceptual level. The use of identities also allows us to express a further uniqueness con-
dition indepen<?-ently of the current state of the world, viz. 
4. Each identity has a unique name. 
7.2.4. 
Maier & Warren [1982] and Maier et al. [1982] introduce a concept of object in their UR model 
which differs from the ABSURD concept. They define an association as a subset of the 
universal set of attributes U which is nondecomposable in some sense. For each database 
scheme a set 4 of associations is defined. In their example with attributes class, instructor and 
student, the associations are {class}, {class, instructor} and {class, instructor, student} (note 
the identification of entity sets with attributes). The nondecomposable relationships expressed 
by these associations are 
there is a catalog of classes, 
an instructor is scheduled to teach a class, and 
a student is registered to take a class from an instructor. 
For each database scheme a set 0 of objects is also defined. A~ W of U is an object if the 
relation on W, r ( W) is the natural join of relations on associations, 
r(W) = tx:l r(X). 
XE,i.X~W 
A database scheme d (4, 0) is a set of associations and a set of objects. 
For an arbitrary set Z of attributes, the window [Z] for Z on the database, or the connec-
tion for Z in the database, is 
[Z] = U IT r ( W) . 
WEO.Z~WZ 
In ABSURD terms, Maier's associations and objects are natural types and the connection 
on an arbitrary set of attributes tis 1rA.rJw*[ext..,(t)]], the set oft-vectors of the current 
extension of t. The difference between Maier's associations and his objects is that associations 
correspond to smallest natural types; objects are unions of types. 
Maier et al. formulate containment conditions for associations, objects and connections. 
The containment conditions are 
1. For associations X, Y E 4: X~ Y ~ I1x(r( Y)) ~X. 
2. For objects V, WE 0: w~ v~ITw(r(V))~r(W). 
3. For the connections for X ,Y ~ U: X~ Y ~ llx ([Y]) ~[X]. 
2 and 3 follow from 1 and the definitions. Translating this into ABSURD, we replace X~ U by 
t ~A and the tuples of a relation on X by the identities in ext.,.. (l). All containment conditions 
then reduce to 
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t 1 ~ t 2 "'*ext w (t 2) ~ext w (t 1) .-
ABSURD thus allows us to express of the containment conditions in a simpler and richer way, 
for theorems 4.1.8 and 5.4.5 give additional statements for natural types and dual statements for 
kinds and natural kinds. 
7.3. Non first normal form relations 
7.3.1. 
The need for non first normal form relations ( N 1 NF relations) was recognized ten years ago by 
Makinouchi [1977] and Furtado & Kerschberg [1977] and, via the introduction of multivalued 
dependencies (MVD's), by Fagin [1977]. Research into MVD's has stayed squarely within the 
relational tradition and research into N 1 NF models has concentrated primarily on the extension 
of the relational model with repeating groups and the definition of relational operators and a 
normal form for relations with set-valued attributes. (Abiteboul & Bidoit [1984], Arisawa et al. 
[1983], Fischer & Furtado & Kerschberg [1977], Hull & Yap [1984], Jaeschke & schek [1982]), 
Kuper & Vardi [1984]), Ozsoyoglu & Ozsoyoglu [1983], Ozsoyoglu & Yuan [1985], Schek & 
Scholl [1986], Thomas [1983]). The extensions to the relational model have alternatively been 
called "Non-first-normal-form relations," "formats," "quotient relations," "summary tables," 
"nested relations," and "relations with relation-valued attributes." Extensions of relational 
operators to relations with set-valued attributes are treated in Fischer & Thomas [1983], 
Jaeschke & Schek [1982], Furtado & Kerschberg [1977], Ozsoyoglu & Ozsoyoglu [1983], and 
Schek & Scholl [1986]. Normal forms for N 1 NF relations are defined by Arisawa et al. [1983] 
and Ozsoyoglu & Yuan [1985]. These papers also prove some results concerning the connection 
between MVD'sd and N1NF relations. Query evaluation for N1NF relations is discussed in 
Kuper & Vardi [1984]. 
A second strand of research, outside that of the relational tradition, is the study of complex 
objects in object-oriented databases (Bancilhon & Koshafian [1986], Khoshafian & Copeland 
[1986]). Complex objects are tuples or sets of primitive or complex objects and can thus be 
viewed as a reincarnation of tuples in a N1NF database. 
A third strand of research stands in the logic programming tradition and tries to extend 
Prolog with set-valued variables (Beeri et al. [1987], Kuper [1987]). This research concentrates 
on giving a denotational and equivalent procedural semantics for logic programming languages 
with sets. 
In this section, we compare ABSURD with Fagin's MVD's and with the LDL language 
defined by Beeri et al. [1987]. A comparison of the ABSURD object concept with that 
Khoshafian & Copeland [1986] was made in section 2.1. 
7.3.2. 
As an example of normalization to 4NF with MVD's, Fagin [1977] gives an example database 
scheme of a university database. In the university UoD, students follow classes which are 
divided into sections. Different sections have different instructors and different meetings days 
and rooms. All sections in a class use the same texts. A student has several scores for exams 
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for a particular section and class. A student has a name, a year (e.g. sophomore) and a major 
(e.g. Math). An instructor has a name, a salary and a rank. The universal scheme to be nor-
malized is 
U = {CLASS, SECTION, STUDENT, MAJOR, EXAM, YEAR, INSTRUCTOR, RANK, SALARY, 
TEXT, DAY, ROOM}. 
The MVD's recognized by Fagin are 
{CLASS, SECTION}-+-+ {STUDENT, MAJOR. EXAM, YEAR} I 
{CLASS, SECTION}-+-+ {INSTRUCTOR, RANK, SALARY} 
{CLASS, SECTION} -+-+ TEXT 
{CLASS, SECTION} -+-+ {DAY, ROOM} 
CLASS -+-+ TEXT 
{CLASS, SECTION, STUDENT}-+-+ EXAM 
After normalization, Fagin comes up with the following 4NF database scheme: 
R 1 =(CLASS, SECTION, STUDENT, EXAM) 
R 2 = (STUDENT,MAJOR ,YEAR) 
R 3 = (INSTRUCTOR, RANK, SALARY) 
R 4 = (CLASS ,SECTION ,INSTRUCTOR) 
R 5 = (CLASS, TEXT) 
R 6 = (CLASS, SECTION, DAY, ROOM). 
Compare this with the attribute names in A and the aggregation graph in figure 9. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
(6) 
A = {name, sections, texts, instructor, students, sessions, salary , rank, major, year, day, 
room, score } . 
In the graph we see set-valued attributes 
name 
NAME 
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Class 
~~ ~edWm 
NAME fc1 (Section) 
Section 
instructor 
Instructor 
salary rank 
SALARY RANK ~name 
NAME-
sections = [Class -+ <9(Seuion)] 
texts = [Class -+ <P(Text)] 
students = [Section -+()>(Student)] 
students 
g;J (Student) 
lw 
Student 
!=P 
MAJOR 
Figure 9. 
~~ 
fc1 (Book) 
sessions 
P (Session) 
w 
Session 
r day room 
YEAR DAY ROOM 
Student x Session 
1~ore 
p (SCORE) 
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sessions = [Section ~ @(Session)] 
score = [Section x Student ~ @(Score)] 
The attribute students corresponds to the MVD ( 1) in that it expresses that there more than one 
students per section. It expresses the relevant real-world fact more precisely than 91), which 
carries also independent information, viz. that a class has sections and a student a major, exam, 
and year. If even more precision is desired, the set constructor @+(x) could be defined as 
@(x)- 0 and students as 
students = [Section ~ @ + (Student)]. 
MVD (2) and (1) hide the information that a class has several sections. Once this is factored out 
by the attribute sections, (2) becomes superfluous. Similarly, (3) and (5) express both the 
information that a class has several texts used by all sections of the class. This is expressed 
more concisely by texts. The attribute sessions states more precisely what ( 4) attempts to say, 
viz. that a section has several sessions which can meet at different times and places. Finally, 
the essence of ( 6) is that a section-student combination can have several scores, is expressed by 
score. 
This brief example illustrates the intimate connection between MVD's and N1NF relations 
and at least suggests that the UoD structures expressed by MVD's can be more naturally 
expressed in ABSURD. 
7.3.3. 
A recent paper by Beeri et al. [1987] reveals the need for sound axiomatic foundations for logic 
programming with sets. In the language defined by Beeri et al., LDL 1, an extension of the 
Logic Based Database Language developed at MCC. There are two ways to define sets in 
LDL 1, by enumeration, which is "the process of constructing a set from its elements," and by 
grouping, which is "defining its elements by a property (i.e., a conjunction of predicates) that 
they satisfy." (Beeri et al. p. 22) One would expect these two ways to be recognizable LDL 1 
variants of the two standard ways to define sets in ZF (or in other axiomatizations). Thus, in 
ZF a is defined by enumeration and b by grouping: 
a- {x,y,z} 
b = {x I 1>(x)}. 
Translation of the LDL 1 examples of enumeration and grouping shows that this is not so. An 
example of enumeration in LDL 1 is 
book_ deal ({X, Y, Z}) +- book (X, Px), book ( Y, Py), book (Z, Pz), Px + Py + Pz < 100. 
The predicate book_deaf is true of all sets of three books whose total price is less than 100. In 
L s, this is the set 
book_deal:={x I x?iE.Bookl\ lx l=3t\sum(price[x])<100}. 
We assume a function sum which, applied to a set of integers, yields the sum o"f the elements of 
its argument, and a natural kind Book to whose elements the attribute price is applicable. 
book_deaf is thus defined by the LDL 1 equivalent of grouping, not enumeration. 
Beeri et al. give the following example of grouping in LDL 1. 
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part (P#, <Subpart#>) +- p (P#, Subpart). 
This groups a relation instance of (PART#, SUBPART#) into an instance of a N 1 NF relation in 
which each part number occurs with the set of its subparts. This is not really an operation in 
L 5 . Instead, the subparts of a part would be reachable by the attribute 
subparts = [Part -+ C9(Subpart) ]. 
The LDL 1 program which uses the above rule to compute the total cost of all subparts is 
part (P#, <Subpart#>) +- p (P#, Subpart). 
tc({X}, C)+- q(X, C). 
tc({x}, C)+- part(X, S), tc(S, C). 
tc(S, C)+- partition(S, S1, S2),tc(S1,C1), tc(S2, C2), +(C1, C2, C3). 
result (P#, C) +- tc ( {P#}, C). 
This is expressed more concisely in L 5 as 
sum (cost [subpart [Part]]). 
Two remarks should be made at this point. First, LDL 1 's concept of grouping is apparently 
motivated by a desire to turn 1 NF relations into N 1 NF relations. This attacks a problem created 
by the state of relational theory: The real world contains sets and set-valued attributes which can 
quite efficiently be implemented as repeating groups, and there is no need to take a detour 
through 1NF representations. All papers cited above about NlNF relations show how to turn 
1NF concepts into NlNF concepts, i.e. they define the semantics of N1NF normal forms, opera-
tions and queries in terms of 1NF normal forms, operations and queries. This calls for a second 
quotation from Atzeni & Parker [1982]: 
By assuming a purely relational model with no semantic structures other than data dependen-
cies, one naturally encounters difficulties that would not arise in "real" databases. In making 
assumptions (such as the universal relation assumption) more for establishing certain results 
(such as the usefulness of 'decomposition' as a design methodology) than for their appropriate-
ness in modelling data, one must realize that the results may not be useful to database 
engineers. 
The ABSURD approach is to step back from current research and describe explicitly which 
structures we want to build database models of. The language for explicit description is an 
extension of L ZF and, as the examples in this chapter show, this language certainly allows us to 
state the essence of the relevant domain structures. 
This brings us to the second remark. E 5 is not meant for implementation in a finite 
machine; if anything, the domain, as an abstraction of the UoD, is the implementation. If we 
can only describe the essence of the domain by dropping the demand of implementability, one 
can wonder whether we have chosen a useful level of abstraction. I hope the above examples, 
and the ones to follow in the next subsection, amply illustrate the usefulness of L 5 in the 
analyst's attempt to get a clear conceptual picture of the UoD (i.e., to construct the domain in 
an empirical fashion. How L 5 can be used in combination with an empirical method to derive 
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true general statements about the UoD will be investigated in a later report.) 
I close this subsection with an example which shows why a conceptual tool like ZF, which 
almost literally is the size of the universe, is needed to crack an egg the size of the UoD. Beeri 
et al. give the following example of an LDLI program which has no model. 
p (<X>) +- p (X). 
Shortcircuiting the explanation Beeri et al. give of the (non-)meaning of this program, it groups 
all elements of X and place the result as an element into X. Obviously, this violates the axiom 
of regularity, for there is no E -minimal element of X. We have 
VY E X[Ynx =F 0]. 
According to Beeri et al., this "is reminiscent of the Russel-Whitehead paradoxes." (ibid., p. 
25). If this is a problem, that means that the axiom of regularity is assumed to hold in models 
of LDL 1 programs. This asks for a more careful elaboration of the relation between LDL 1 pro-
grams and axiomatic set theory. The top-down approach followed in this report, extending the 
language of ZF with constants and using it to talk about possible worlds which sit in the 
universe of axiomatic set theory, starts on the right foot from the beginning and, in addition to 
having a sound formal basis, allows one to express the relevant domain structures in a precise 
and concise manner. 
7.4. "Semantic" data models 
7.4.1. 
The word "semantic" is placed between quotes because it is hard to see what a nonsemantic 
model would be like. (See note 2 in the preface.) We use the word because it is the term used 
in the literature. In a handy overview and comparison, Urban & Delcambre [1986] evaluate a 
number of "semantic" data models on their static and their dynamic modelling capabilities 
according to an explicit list of criteria. As explained in the beginning of this chapter, these 
models take a level of abstraction between the DB and the domain and consequently Urban & 
Delcambre talk about the domain as well as the database. For example, talk of objects, classes, 
properties, classification etc. is clearly applicable to the domain (as well as the database), but 
talk of operations on the database, updates, internal identifiers, procedural attachment etc. is 
applicable to the database only. In the following evaluation, we only look at criteria applicable 
to the domain, and regard them as citeria for the evaluation of the structures commonly found 
in domains. We treat the criteria for static structures only, for these are the topic of this report. 
The criteria are divided into six groups, which have the following headings. 
1. The identification of objects. 
2. The classification of objects. 
3. The aggregation of objects. 
4. Generalization hierarchies of objects. 
5. Association of objects. 
6. Metaclasses. 
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Each of the data models reviewed by Urban & Delcambre, RM/T, TAXIS, SDM, SHM+, and 
the Event Model, is judged by them on the availability of structures falling under these head-
ings. We devote a short section to the criteria in each of these groups. In order to show that 
the ABSURD concepts can provide a conceptual foundation for the data models discussed by 
Urban &Delcambre, we quote and discuss their definitions as well as discussing their results. 
Unless otherwise stated, all quotations are from Urban & Delcambre [1986]. 
7.4.2. Objects 
"Objects represent both the concrete and abstract entities of interest in the application domain""' 
Objects are obviously supported by our model, with a slight but significant change in terminol-
ogy. The "application domain" is our UoD. In ABSURD, objects represent concrete or con-
ceptual entities in the UoD instead of concrete or abstract entities. Use of the word conceptual 
emphasises the importance of the interest which the people living in the UoD have in the 
represented entities. The objects themselves are abstract entities in the domain, and represent 
entities in the UoD. All data models discussed by Urban & Delcambre support some sort of 
object construct. 
"Internal identifiers uniquely represent the existence of each distinct object in the data-
base, allowing objects to be directly interrelated without relying on external identifiers as 
foreign keys." Dropping the words "internal" and "external," this applies to ABSURD. Most 
models evaluated by Urban & Delcambre support some notion of identity. 
7A.3. Classes 
"A class describes a collection of objects with common properties." This notion is supported by 
all data models and by ours as well. As a critical remark it may be noted that none of the 
models make very clear what it is to have common properties. What is it that two ships of dif-
ferent type, owned by different companies, commanded by a different captain and located in 
different parts of the globe have in common? In this report, what they have in common is 
explicated as the applicability of attributes. It is this common applicability which makes it pos-
sible to draw up the list of differences in the last sentence but one. A correct notion of pro-
perty is important for theoretical as well as practical reasons. For theoretical reasons, because 
not every property determines a set (the property x EE x being a case in point). For practical 
reasons, because the system designer needs some clues in deciding what to look for when 
dissecting the UoD. 
Some of the specialities offered by some of the data models are: 
Cardinality constraints. The Event Model allows the user to define constraints on the 
cardinality of the number of instances in a class. The static part of such a constraint can be 
expressed quite easily as a conjunct in /C, though formulation of the dynamic part of it must 
wait till a forthcoming report. The number of existing objects in a world is I ext w(em) I and 
the number of existing persons is I Persons w I . 
There is some sloppiness in the notion of class multiplicity as it is discussed (very briefly) 
by King & McLeod [1984]. They talk about a class as "representing" the existence of a set of 
objects. In ABSURD terms, what is meant is that the extension of a kind has a certain cardi-
nality, i.e. kw = n for ann E IN. 
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Class attributes. SDM supports the notion of properties of "a class as a whole." For 
example, average -age is a property of a class of persons. This is represented naturally in our 
data model, because all identities are sets, albeit that some have their elements outside S. 
Thus, we can easily define an attribute 
average -age = [(Person)~ nat] 
subject to the integrity constraint 
Vx E .:¥'(Person)[average -agew(.r) = sum(agew[x])/ lx I)], 
where sum computes the sum of a set of natural numbers. 
The treatment of class properties in SDM is criticized by Urban & Delcambre because 
class properties cannot be inherited by subclasses in SDM. What is meant, presumably, is that 
if k 0 is any set of identities, that any subset k 1 of k 0 should be at least of the same type, i.e. all 
attributes applicable to elements of k 0 should be applicable to the elements of k 1. This is neces-
sarily so in our model. Theorem 4.1.4.6 says that 
k 1 ~ k 0 ~type (k 0) ~type (k 1). 
Recall that this is valid for all k ~ S, also those which are sets of subsets of S. An immediate 
consequence, for example, is that 
An analogous statement can be derived for extensions k w. 
In sum, the specialities offered by some data models are all present in our model. Integra-
tion of all of them in one framework requires a more coherent framework than these data 
models offer. In particular, the following types of sets need be distinguished. Each of the dis-
tinctions made is violated by at least one data model. 
1. A set is a collection of objects. 
2. A type is a set of attributes. 
3. A natural kind is the set of all possible objects to which all attributes in a given type apply. 
4. The extension of a natural kind in a world is the set of existing objects in w of that kind. 
The extension of a type is the set of existing objects of that type. 
5. A set identity is an identity which has all its elements in S. A set attribute is an attribute 
whose value has all its elements in S. 
6. A class is a set of objects, i.e. (identity, state) pairs. 
7 .4.4. Aggregation 
Atomic objects like social security numbers or names can be aggregated into aggregate objects 
like persons. Urban & Delcambre look at two aspects of aggregation, the nature of the objects 
aggregated and the support for "semantic relativism." We first treat the list of special features 
concerning the nature of the objects aggregated. 
Set-valued attributes. "SDM and the Event Model both directly support multi-valued 
properties, while RM/T, TAXIS, and SHM + rely on single-valued properties only." Set-valued 
attributes are a central element of our moue!. 
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Exhausting a value set. In SDM, RM/T, and the Event Model one can specify that the 
attribute members of elements of Project must "exhaust its value set," i.e. that each employee 
must be a member of a project. In L s, this would be npressed as the integrity constraint 
Empw ~membersw(Projectw). 
Note that we have resolved an ambiguity in the concept of value exhaustion in that we require 
existing employees to be members of existing projects. 
Non-overlapping attribute values. This facility is defined by Hammer & McLeod [1981] 
(p. 363) as follows: 
" ... the values of the attribute for two different entities have no entities in common, 
that is, each member of the value class of the attribute is used at most once." 
This can mean two things. Expressed in L s, the first possible meaning of the definition is that 
a has non-overlapping values if 
Vx, y E ext 111 ( {a })[x =I= y =*a 111 (x) naw(Y) = 0]. 
This constraint can be strengthened to a statement about all possible values for a, 
Vx, y E dom(a) Vf E a [x =I= y =-f(x) nJ(y) = 0]. 
The second possible meaning of the definition of non-overlapping values is that a w is a 1-1 
function, which is to say that it is a key: a = [k 1 -!-! k 2]. 
The example they give suggest that this is what they mean: 
"For example, Engines of SHIPS is specified as having "no overlap in values," which 
means that any engine can be only in one ship." 
Constant vs. time-varying attributes. The ABSURD possible worlds framework allows 
us to distinguish operations, which deliver the same result in every possible world, from attri-
butes, whose result depends upon the current world. Attributes can be divided in constant attri-
butes, which cannot be changed once an object to which the attribute is applicable is in 
existence, and variable attributes, which may change once an object to which the attribute 
applies has been instantiated. Constant attributes could have received another value at instan-
tiation time, but cannot be changed after instantiation time (See section 3 .3). None of the 
models discussed here distinguishes constant attributes from operations. 
Null values. This is a moot point, if only because the meaning of a null value is usually 
left open to interpretation by the user of the_ database. We allow only one "null value," 0, 
with the meaning absent. name (x) = 0 means that x has no name and members (y) = 0 
means that y has no members. Most models support the use of a "null value," but the seman-
tics of these values has not been worked out satisfactorily. Of the 14 different types of null 
values distinguished by ANSI [1975] (cited by Atzeni & Parker [1982]), we have formalized 
inapplicability and absence. Of the remaining ones, some with dynamic connotations (such as 
"not yet existent") will be formalized in a forthcoming report about domain dyn<~;mics. Others, 
like "not known" belong to the DB, not the domain. 
Urban & Delcambre also discuss virtual properties, which are "properties that are defined 
through procedural attachment or through opt' rations on other properties in the database." This 
is clearly a database concept. In the domain, the difference between stored and computed 
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values does not have a meaning. 
The second major aspect of aggregation, next to the nature of the objects aggregated, is 
semantic relativism. Semantic relativism is defined by Brodie [1984] as "the ability to view 
and manipulate data in the way most appropriate for the viewer." Put this way, it belongs to the 
database, not the domain. The domain theory describes the world in terms of which all user 
views must be defined. In general, a finite database will store information which represents not 
one, but several domains and this ambiguity will be transfered to the user views defined on the 
database. All post-relational data models support some kind of semantic relativism. 
7.4.5. Generalization 
"Generalization is a form of abstraction in which objects are viewed as higher-level generic 
objects, suppressing the differences between objects and emphasizing their common proper-
ties .... Specialization is the reverse of generalization.'' "A II of the models support generaliza-
tion, but they differ in the manner in which generalization hierarchies are formed." Not only 
this, they do not have an explicit theory of generalization. In ABSURD, generalization is pri-
marily a relation between types and secondarily between natural kinds. If k 1 ~ k 2 , then k 1 is a 
specialization of k 2 iff 
There are three headings under which Urban & Delcambre evaluate generalization, 
1. Inheritance of properties, 
2. Restriction of inherited attribute values, and 
3. Formation of the generalization hierarchy. 
Inheritance of properties. All models support inheritance of attribute applicability. There are 
other types of inheritance, though, such as inheritance of default values for attributes. Because 
"property" can mean attribute as well as attribute value, it is often not clear what exactly is sup-
ported by the different systems. Inheritance of attribute values comes again in two specialities, 
strict value inheritance, in which all instances of a class share a certain attribute value, and 
default inheritance properly so called, which is the instantiation of an object of a class with 
default values for certain attributes unless these values are overridden. Default logic is still in 
its infancy and is not treated here. Strict value inheritance is a special case of attribute restric-
tion, treated below. 
Attribute restriction. TAXIS, SDM and the Event Model provide a facility for restricting 
the inherited attribute values. This can be represented in two ways in our model. One is to 
define a predicate on a natural class, e.g. {x E Person I sex (x) = male}. This defines a sub-
set of Person. We have not provided a way to name this set (unless it is equal to a identity, in 
which case it is named by s) and we do not regard this set necessarily as a specialization of Per-
son, because the set of attributes applicable to it may be the same as type (Person). The other 
way to restrict attribute values is to take a specialization, e.g. Seer C Emp, and define a sub kind 
of this kind, for example {x E Seer I age(x)<30}. In both cases, there are two aspects to be 
distinguished. 
First, the introduction of names for defined sets is a matter of the user interface, not of the 
domain. The sets defined by attribute restriction.;; <lre part of the domain, but their names, if 
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not in CON, are part of the user interface. 
Second, assuming that all sets we may possibly be interested in have a name in the domain 
theory, we may ask what the logic of specialization by attribute restriction is. There is an 
interesting metaphysical question connected with this, which is whether we get a more detailed 
specialization hierarchy if we add specialization by attribute restriction to specialization by attri-
bute inheritance. If k is a natural kind, is it necessarily so that the kind k' = {x E · k I cp(x)} 
(if it is a set) is a natural kind in our sense? That is, can we find a non-trivial attribute which is 
applicable precisely to the elements of k' and to no other identities? If so, attribute restriction 
adds nothing to attribute inheritance. 
An interesting speculation to be investigated in the future is whether identities that share a 
common generic process form a natural kind. Can the concept of natural kind be sharpened by 
allowing predicates on kinds which single out a set of identities which in some sense "behave 
similarly?" Common life cycles are an important element of the biological concept of natural 
kinds (see Mayr [ .... ]). But the most important element in the biological concept of natural 
kind is common descent. The formalizability of these matters in the context of database domain 
modelling is a matter worthy of future investigation. 
Formation of the generalization hierarchy. This is really a matter of the user interface. 
Generalizations are not "formed," they simply exist in the domain. However, names may be 
given to certain sets, and this is a process in the user interface. But the four ways in Urban & 
Delcambre's summary in which generalizations can be "formed" can be viewed as four ways to 
describe sets, and as such they will be discussed. It will be surprising if we cannot account for 
them, for ZF is the one of the strongest ways to describe sets which is consistent. 
1. Attribute-defined subclasses pose no problem in our model, as is seen by the example 
given above. 
2. User-defined subclasses are not part of the domain. 
3. Set-operator defined subclasses are obviously definable by us. 
4. Existence-defined subclasses in SDM are sets of objects which are the value of a specified 
attribute. For example, the set DANGEROUS- CAPTAINS is defined as the set of OFF-
ICERS which are a value of the attribute involved -captain of INCIDENTS (Hammer & 
McLeod [1981], p. 359). 17 In L 5 , this set is described as 
involved -captain w [Incidents w]. 
Multiple inheritance. This is supported by all models except the Event model. It is cen-
tral in our model ( 4. 2). 
Mutual exclusion of subclasses. This is supported by SHM + and (optionally) by RM/T 
and SDM. It is also a central element in our model ( 4 .2). 
17. This is an interesting case of the influence on the state uf the UoD by the presence of an information 
system. The concept of dangerous captain is reified, if not ossified, and made available to users of the in-
formation system, who will apply their intuitive understanding of it to the captain involved, who is thereby 
ostracized and may be petrified. 
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7 .4.6. Association 
~Association is a form of abstraction in which objects (possibly heterogenous in nature) are 
viewed as members of a higher-level set object." It is not clear what this adds to the concept of 
generalization as defined above. In ABSURD terms, an "association" is simply a non-natural 
kind. An example of the use of a non-natural kind is 
members: Project- CS>((Secr UEng) nPerm). 
~ l u~ 2 is not a natural kind (4.2.6). 
If anything, Urban & Delcambre's discussion of association shows that "semantic model-
ling" lacks conceptual foundations. The current report is an attempt to provide such founda-
tions. As can be seen from the this comparison, the concepts which have been developed are 
not new, but have a clarity which facilitate the description of the issues involved and the com-
parison of the solutions proposed. 
Association is supported by RM/T, SDM and SHM +, but only RM/T supports association 
of heterogenous objects as defined above for members. 
7 .4. 7. Metaclasses 
"A metaclass is a class m which the instances themselves are classes." In our terminology, a 
metaclass is a set whose elements are subsets of S. Just as for the concept of association, the 
concept of meta class adds nothing to the set concept as we adopted it from ZF. Rather, it 
detracts from it, for the elements of the elements of a metaclass cannot be sets themselves. The 
use of sets as identities is, not surprisingly, a very powerful idea. 
The term ~metaclass" is perhaps a bit mystifying as compared to the ZF concept of a set. 
Usually, "meta" is used to indicate "aboutness." For example, English is the metalanguage for 
L 5 , for we use it to talk about those languages. Similarly, the data dictionary (DD) of DBMS 
is a metadatabase, for its contents describe the database, i.e. are about it. The data in a DD are 
metadata. We may structure the DD in any way, but it is folkore to give it the same structure 
as the DB which it represents. It will then contain objects which have a kind, type and class, 
but it would go to far (and against the decision to give it the same structure as the DB) to use a 
different terminology for the DD and talk of metakin(b, metatypes and metaclasses. 
Metaclasses are supported by TAXIS and SDM. The two headings under which Urban & 
delcambre looked at metaclasses are 
1. Formation of metaclasses and 
2. Generalization of metaclasses. 
Concerning the first heading the same remarks can be made as for the formation of the generali-
zation hierarchy. The two types of formation discussed by Urban & Delcambre are attribute-
defined and user-specified; in our model the full range of descriptional facilities is available for 
metaclasses as for sets, for metaclasses are sets. 
Only TAXIS supports generalization of metaclasses. This, too, is described effortlessly 
in our model. 
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7.4.8. 
It thus turns out that the use of ZF allows the precise expression of advanced domain struc-
tures. Realization of those structures in a database is, of course, a wholly different matter but 
this is not the immediate aim of the present research. (But see appendix 4, where the models of 
the domain axiomatization may be used to define the structure of global database identifiers.) 
I believe that the above comparison shows that the study of domain structures indepen-
dently of time- and space limitations is the proper way to get to grips with the conceptual per-
plexities of database domain modelling. The static structures studied here are very complex. 
The state spaces of physical systems have a simpler structure in that generalization, aggregation 
and sets do not occur in such a complex way. Explication of these structure in L 5 has the 
advantage that decisions must be made at the stage where they belong, during the analysis of the 
UoD, and not when it may be too late, during implementation. At implementation time we may 
discover that we implicitly have made decisions which turn out to be wrong or improper to the 
UoD. If these had been made during analysis of the UoD, at least they would have been made 
conscioussly, and the implementation options could have been described with a clearer under-
standing of the UoD. 
8.1. Summary 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
I have formalized the domain structures of classification, aggregation, grouping and specializa-
tion into a coherent framework which is interpreted in a set-theoretical universe. The concepts 
and formal tools used are drawn from four worlds, that of database theory, set theory, object-
oriented programming and logic. The binding element is the concept of identity. In ABSURD, 
an identity is a set and attributes are sets of functions on identities. Identities can be classified 
into natural kinds, which in this report are just identities with the same aggregation structure but 
in a forthcoming report are isomorphic identities executing the same generic process. The fact 
that objects have an internal state which can be changed by even~s and that the effect of an 
event depends upon the state of the world, distinguishes natural kinds from ADT's. 
The set, aggregation and generalization structures are axiomatized in E 5 , for which IN 
effectively functions as a model (appendix 4). This creates a direct link with the implementa-
tion, notably with the structure of global database identitifiers. Each model for the axiomatiza-
tion can be turned into a set of possible worlds which do or do not satisfy the static integrity 
constraints. When a world satisfies the static constraints, it is called admissible. 
The major simplifying assumptions made in this and the following reports are: 
1. The merging of two or more entities into one is not described. 
2. The splitting of an entity into two or more is not described. 
3. A change of applicability of attributes is not described. 
4. Specialization is by attribute addition only. 
Even with these limitations, the ABSURD model proved to be a powerful tool to conceptually 
clarify the proposals for "semantic" models and non first normal form models. 
8.2. Future research 
Much work still has to be done to show that the ABSURD approach is viable. On the side of 
the UoD, ABSURD concepts should be tried out in an information analysis to see how much 
conceptual help they give in the formation of clear abstractions from the UoD. On the side of 
the DB, finiteness should be taken into account and it should be shown how an ABSURD model 
can be implemented in a finite database. In the domain itself, the static possible worlds struc-
ture developed in this report should be extended with a dynamic component to specify van 
Fraassen 's "laws of succession and interaction." 
To round out this picture, at the level of the user interface a number of interesting practi-
cal and philosophical questions crop up. Should all idemities be visible to the user? Should 
they be pictured in linear or two-dimensional format? On a more principled level, what is the 
effect of a precise specification of domain dynamics on the UoD? As is coming to be realized 
in the data modelling community, an information system not only contains statements of fact 
about the UoD, it also contains spt>ech acts which influence the UoD (Lehtinen & Lyytinen 
[1986]). 
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Appendix 1 
List of notations 
metavariables over the set of wff's 
metavariables over individual variables (sets) 
metavariables over the individual variables and class symbols 
metavariables over CON 
meta variables over CON A 
metavariables over attributes 
metavariables over types (subsets of A) 
meta variables over natural types (type (kind (I)) = t) 
metavariables over kinds (subsets of S) 
meta variables over natural kinds (kind (type (k-)) = k-) 
metavariables over CON NK 
metavariables over worlds 
metariables over objects ((si, a)) 
metavariables over states 
identity names (surrogate names) 
Occasionally, t is used as meta variable over terms. 
Meta variables are variables in the metalanguage (English). In the metalanguage, they can be 
quantified over (e.g. "for all c in CON"). As a symbol for a formula in the object language, 
Vx [¢(x )] is well-formed but Vc E CON[¢(x )] is ill-formed. 
Use of the meta variables over individual variables of L 5 allows one to drop appropriate 
conditions, e.g. 
Vk-[¢(k-)] 
is an abbreviation of 
Vx [x ~ S 1\ x = kind (type (x )) =}¢(x )] 
and 
3k-[¢(k-)] 
of 
3x[x ~S 1\ x = kind(type(x)) 1\ ¢(x)]. 
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Appendix 2 
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory 
A.2.1. 
An axiomatization of ZF is presented in Takeuti & Zaring [1971]. This appendix summarizes 
the main points, borrowing some logical definitions from Enderton [1972]. 
We call the language of ZF LzF. The primitive symbols used in LzF are 
Individual variables: 
There are infinitely many variables. These are not actually given, and the letters 
X, y, Z, ... , 
are used as metavariables over the collection of individual variables. 
Predicate symbol: E . 
logical symbols: -, , 1\ , V , "* , ~ , V, 3 . 
Auxiliary symbols: ( ) , [ ] . 
The letters 
are meta variables over the set of well-formed formula's ( wff's). For example, the formula 
Vx[<P(x)] 
is an expression in the metalanguage (English), from which a formula in LzF may be gotten by 
replacing <P by a string of the symbols listed above and x by an actual variable of L ZF. We 
keep the convention that in <f>(x) at least x occurs as free variable. If we fix the individual vari-
ables of L ZF as 
X, y, Z, 
then the result of the replacement might be the wff 
Vx[-,x Ex]. 
A wff is a symbol constructed out of the primitive symbols of LzF according to only the 
following rules. 
1. If x and y are individual variables, then x E y is a wff. 
2. If <P and 1/; are wff's then -, <P, <P V 1/;, <P 1\ 1/;, <P "* 1/;, and <P ~ 1/; are wff's. 
3. If <P is a wff and x an individual variable then Vx [<P] and 3x [<P] are wff's. 
If x is free in <P we will often write <f>(x) for <P. We also abbreviate 
Vx [x E a =*<P(x )] by Vx E a [<f>(x )] 
and 
3x[x E a 1\ <P(x)] by 3x E a[<f>(x)]. 
A.2.2. 
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The logical axioms used by Takeuti & Zaring are 
1. rp=>(if;=>rp). 
2. (¢=>(1/;=>ry)) =>((¢=>'/;) =>(rfJ=>ry)). 
3. ("'rp='> '1/;)=>(if;=>rp). 
4. Vx(¢=>1/;)=>(¢=> Vxif;) ifx isnotfreein¢. 
5. Vx rp(x) => rp( a) where x has no free occurrence in a well formed part of rp of the form 
Val/;. 
The inference rules are 
1 . From rp and rp =>if; infer if;. 
2. From ¢ infer Vx ¢. 
If E is a set of sentences containing the logical axioms, then by Cn (E) we mean the set of sen-
tences which logically follow from E. For example, if E FOL is the set of logical axioms, then 
Cn (E Fod is the set of sentences derivable from the logical axioms and if E ZF is the set of 
axioms of ZF, then Cn o: FOL U E ZF) is the set of all theorems of ZF. 
A.2.3. 
A major concern of axiomatic set theory is the avoidance of the paradoxes of naive set theory. 
In ZF, this is done by distinguishing sets from classes. The class symbol 
{x I rp(x)} 
is used to denote the class of all x such that ¢(x). The letters 
A,B, · · · 
are used as metavariables over the individual variables and class symbols. 
Every set is a class, but not every class is a set. A class which is not a set is called a 
proper class. Formally, the predicate ,j( (expressing that its argument is a set) is defined by 
uU'(A) : = 3x [x = A]. 
A well-known example of a proper class is the Russell class 
{x I x EE x }. 
The class of all sets is called V. In this report, we are only concerned with subsets of V. The 
word "class" is also used in a different way, to indicate certain sets of objects which have an 
internal state 0 Context will make clear in which sense the word is used. 
To be able to talk about proper classes in L ZF, the concept of wff is extended so that in 
addition to wff's certain formulas in which the symbol 
{x I rp(x)} 
occurs are well-formed as well. A wff in the wider sense can be constructed from wffs in the 
original sense by using only the following rules. 
1 . If t 0 and t 1 are terms, then t 0 E £ 1 is a wff in the wider sense 0 
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2. If ¢ and 1/; are wff's in the wider sense and a and b are individual variables, then 
a E {x I ¢(x)}, 
{x I ¢(x)} E b , and 
{x I ¢(x)} E {x 11/;(x)} 
are wff's in the wider sense. 
3. If¢ and 1/; are wff's in the wider sense then ...., ¢, ¢ V 1/;, ¢1\ 1/;, ¢ =>1/;, and¢~ 1/; are wff's 
in the wider sense. 
4. If¢ is a wff in the wider sense and x an individual variable then Vx [fi] and 3x [fi] are 
wff's in the wider sense. 
Every wff in the wider sense is an abbreviation of a wff in the original sense. Takeuti and Zar-
ing define give rules for translating a wff in the wider sense to a unique wff in the original 
sense. As an example, if¢ and 1/; are wff's in the original sense, then 
{x I ¢(x)} E {x I 1/;(x)} 
can be translated into 
3x[lj;(x) 1\ Vy[y Ex ~¢(y)]]. 
A.2.4. 
LzF has only one predicate symbol, E . The following predicates can be defined in terms of 
E . These predicates are introduced by definitions, but are used as if they were primitive 
predicates and as if their definitions were added as axioms to E ZF. x, y and f are (metavari-
ables over the) variables of LzF· 
~({(A). 
X = y. 
X ~y. 
x Cy. 
f:x- y 
J:x -1-1 
f:x 
-onto 
f:x -1-1 onto 
A.2.5. 
y. 
y. 
y. 
A symbol of the form {x I ¢(x)} is called a class symbol and denotes the class of all entities 
which satisfy ¢(x). All of the classes defined in this report are sets. In particular, Takeuti & 
Zaring define the following sets. x and y are sets. 
0 
<x, y > (The ordered pair x, y .) 
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x -y (The difference between two sets.) 
x xy (Cartesian product.) 
II f(x) 
x E a 
f [x ]. (the image of x under f. Only used iff is a function, but defined for every set f.) 
dom (f). (Will only be used for functions, but is defined for every set.) 
range (f). (Only used for functions.) 
X 0 Y. (Only used for functions.) 
fN and arithmetical operations on natural numbers. (We use the symbol fN instead of the 
customary w of set theory.) 
In addition, we assume the following sets to have been defined. 
6'+(x) (non-empty subsets of x .) 
8i"(x) (Finite subsets of x .) 
,q;-+(x) (Non-empty finite subsets of x .) 
STRINGS (a) = U II (f (x)). (strings of 0 or more elements of a . ) 
n E INx E n 
x •y . (concatenation of finite strings x , y E STRINGS (a) . ) 
lx 1. (length of a finite stringx E STRINGS(a).) 
5. a. (lexicographical ordering of strings over a, where a is a well-ordered set.) 
CO , 71.. and IR , and arithmetical operations on these sets. 
It is clear that we could also have defined matrices and matrix operations and other mathemati-
cal objects and operations, if necessary. 
As an example of the translation of expressions in which these abbreviations occur into 
wff' s of L ZF' X n y is the class {z I z E X 1\ z E y } ' so that the wff in the wider sense 
a EX ny 
can be translated into the wff in the wider sense 
a E {z I z E x 1\ z E y } 
and then into the wff 
aEx/\aEy. 
A.2.6. 
The axioms in E ZF are 
1 . Extensionality. 
V a V x Vy [x = y 1\ x E a ~ y E a ] . 
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2. Pairing. 
Va V b./It ({a , b } ) . 
3. Unions. 
Vault( U (a)), where U (a) is the union of the elements of a . 
4. Powers. 
Va (ult( <S'(a)). 
5. Schema of replacement. 
Va[Vu Vv Vw[<f>(u, v) 1\ <f>(u, w)=H = w]=> 3b Vy[y E b# 3x[x E a 1\ <f>(x,y)]]]. 
(Intuitively, this says that functions map sets onto sets.) 
6. Regularity. 
Va[a * 0 => 3x[x E a 1\ X na = 0]]. (This prevents the Russell paradox.) 
7. Infinity. 
u/t(fN). 
We do not use the axiom of choice, 
Va 3f Vx E a[x * 0 =>f(x) Ex]. 
(This axiom is equivalent to the statement that every set can be well ordered. a is well-ordered 
by R if there is an R -minimal element of a and every two elements of a are pairwise compati-
ble.) 
So far, we have given the syntax and derivation rules of a formal language and some logi-
cal o:Fad and nonlogical (LzF) axioms. We abbreviate r;FOL UI:zF by ZF. In the rest of 
this report we extend L ZF with constants naming objects in the domain and extend the axiom set 
ZF with axioms describing the domain. In other words, the domain is a structure for the 
extended language and is a model for the extended axiom set axioms. As a preliminary, we 
first define what it is to be a model of ZF. 
A.2. 7. Definition 
A structure for a first-order language L is a pair [D, I] in which D is a set and I an interpreta-
tion function such that 
1. /(c) E D for each constant symbol c; 
2. I (f): D n - D for each n-ary function symbol f; 
3. l(P)'i:.Dn for each n-place predicate symbol P. 0 
A plied to L ZF, the situation is very simple because we have no constants or function symbols 
and only one predicate constant, E . 
A.2.8. Definition 
[D, I] is a structure for LzF if 
1. D 'i:. V, where V is the class of all sets, and 
2. I( E )~DxD. 
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[D , I] is a standard structure for L ZF if 
I( E ) = E . 
It is called a standard transitive structure if 
X ED ~X ~D. D 
We only consider standard transitive structures for L ZF. 
At first sight, the interpretation of the formal language of set theory in a structure 
described by the formal language of set theory may seem strange, but this procedure is not dif-
ferent from that followed for other languages. Each n-ary function symbol (n = 0, 1, , ... , ) is 
assigned a function Dn ~ D (which is simply a constant when n = 0) and each n -place predi-
cate is assigned a subset of Dn. What is peculiar about this procedure is that the language 
being interpreted is the language in which the model is described. In the interpretation of an 
arbitrary formal language L, we use the language of set theory to talk about a model of L . If L 
is the language of set theory, we use L to talk about a model of L. The symbols ~, x and 
E used to define [D , I] above, are the same symbols as those defined in L ZF. This shows 
that LzF is about as basic as we can get in reasoning about models in general and the domain of 
a DB in particular and that we have to bootstrap our way from axiomatic set theory to the 
theory of models of set theory. 
The consequence of this bootstrap procedure is that truth of a wff in a structure is defin-
able in LZF itself. 
A.2.9. Definition 
Let [D, I] be a standard structure for LzF. The symbol f= , to be read as "satisfies," is 
defined as a predicate in L ZF as follows. (: = is to be read as "is defined by.") 
1 . [D ' I] F X E y : = X E D 1\ y E D 1\ X E y . 
2. [D' I] F 't:/> : = ' ( [D' I] F t:/>). 
3. [D,l] F t:/> 1\ 1/; := ([D,/] F t:/>) 1\ ([D,I] F 1/;). 
4. [D, I] f= 'v'x[t:f>(x)] := 'v'x[[D, I] F= t:f>(x)]. D 
In other words, formula t:/> is true in [D, I] iff a certain other formula is derivable in ZF. This 
other formula restricts the variables to D. The following definition and theorem make this pre-
cise. 
A.2.10. Definition 
Let [D , I] be a standard structure for L ZF. Then the wff 1>0 is defined as follows. 
1. [x E y ]0 : = X E y. 
2 . [•t:/>]D := •t:/>o. 
3. [ t:f> J\ 1j; ]D : = t:/>D J\ 1/;D . 
4. ['v'x[t:f>(x)]]0 := 'v'x E D[t:f>0 (x)]. D 
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In words, ¢ 0 is ¢ with quantification restricted to D. 
A.2.11. Theorem 
Let [D, I] be a standard structure. 
1 . If ¢ is closed then 
2. If all free variables occurring in ¢ are among x 1, ••• , x n, then 
Proof. 
See Takeuti & Zaring, theorem 12.5. 0 
Truth of a closed formula ¢ in [D, I] is therefore equivalent to derivability of ¢ 0 , where ¢ 0 
differs from ¢ only in that quantification is restricted to D instead of to V. If ¢ has free vari-
ables, then the same statement must be qualified by demanding that x E D for all free vari-
ables x of¢. 
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Appendix 3 
The example domain axiomatization in L s (CON ) 
Constants of L 5 (CON): 
CON = CON A U CON NK U {NA , A , NK, em } 
CON A = {ext, emp#, salary, name, licence#, typing -speed, skill, contr#, #years, project#, 
project -type, members, task} 
CON NK = {S, Emp, Trucker, Ldtrucker, Seer, Eng, Temp, Perm, Project} 
Predicates: 
E. 
Defined sets: 
EMP##, NAMES, LICENCE#, /NT-LICENCE#, SPEEDS, SKILLS, CONTRACT#, PROJECT#, 
PROJECT-TYPES, TASKS. 
Axioms: 
L S = L FOL u L I u LA u L NK u L SP • 
Logical axioms: 
L FOL = { 
c/>~(1/;~c/>), 
( cJ> ~ ( 1/; ~ T/)) "'* ( ( cJ> "'* 1/;) ~ ( cJ> ~ T/)), 
('<:/>"'* '1/;)"'*(1/;"'*c/>), 
Vx(cp~tj;)~(c/>~ Vxl/;), 
Vxcp(x)~c/>(t)} 
Identity axioms 
~ t-t S] 
onro ' 
0 E S, 
em EE S }. 
Attribute axioms: 
Va E A [a = emp# V ... Va =task], 
ext = [Ext ~ -~(S)], 
emp# = [Emp ~t-t EMP##], 
salary = [Emp ~ IN +], 
name = Emp U Project ~NAMES], 
licence# = [Trucker ~J-t LICENCE##], 
int -licence# = [Ldtrucker -jo 1- 1 !NT-LICENCE##], 
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typing -speed = [Seer --+ SPEEDS], 
skill = [Eng --+ SKILLS], 
contr# = [Contract --+I- 1 CONTRACT##], 
#years = [Perm --+ IN ] 
project# = [Project --+ 1- 1 PROJECT##], 
project -type = [Project --+ PROJECT- TYPES], 
members = [Project--+ J7(Emp xTASK)]}. 
Natural kind axioms: 
2:. N K = {N K c;:; (}> ( S ) , 
{Emp, ... , Project-member}c;:;NK, 
kind(type(Emp)) = Emp, 
kind (type (Project)) = Project}. 
Specialization axioms: 
2:. SP = {S = Emp U Project U Project -member, 
Emp nProject = 0, Emp nProject -member = 0, Project nProject -member 0, 
Emp = Trucker U Seer U Eng, 
Trucker n Seer = 0, Trucker n Eng 0, Seer n Eng = 0, 
Ldtrucker c;:; Trucker, 
Emp = Temp U Perm, 
Temp nPerm = 0 }. 
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Appendix 4 
A model for the example domain axiomatization 
To define a model for I: 5 , we must define the interpretation function in the structure [V, /] 
such that/( E ) = E and /(c) E D for each c E CON. A simple model for the example 
domain theory is as follows. :l7(x) is the set of finite subsets of x . 
1. /(S) = rN U(rN xrN)U.'¥(rN). 
2. /(em) = -2. 
3. I (NA ) = - 1. 
4. I(Emp) = {2n +1 I n E rN }. 
/(Project) = {2n +2 I n E rN }. 
/(Trucker) = {6n + 1 I n E rN }. 
!(Seer) = {6n +3 I n E rN }. 
/(Eng) = {6n +5 I n E rN }. 
/(Temp) = {12n +i I n E rN, i = 1, 3, 5}. 
/(Perm)= {12n +i I n E rN, i = 7, 9, 11}. 
/(Ldtrucker) = {24n +i I n E rN, i = 1, 7}. 
It can easily be seen that these sets satisfy the specialization axioms. Some examples of attri-
bute definitions are 
5. l(emp#) = [{2n+l In ErN} ~I-I {2n+l In ErN}]. 
/(members)= [{2n +2 I n E rN} ~ .:7({2n +1 I n E ·rN }xl(TASK))]. 
These interpretations respect the axioms in I: A . If it is whished that EMP## or other defined 
sets be disjoint from other sets, then this should be added to I: SP. 
The natural kind axioms are satisfied as well. For example, in this model Emp is precisely 
the set of numbers in the intersection of the domain of all attributes in type (Emp), so 
Emp = kind(type(Emp)). If Emp would have been given a different interpretation, for exam-
ple {4n + 1 1· n E rN } (with the interpretation of the subkinds adjusted accordingly), then Emp 
would not have been a natural kind. 
It is clear that this model is not minimal. For example,S could have been interpreted as 
rN U {2n +1 In E rN }x{2n +2 In ErN }U.:7({2n +1 In ErN}). What is needed is not so 
much a minimal model but one which is convenient in that the implementation can easily check 
of which kinds an identity is by looking at the form of the number which implements the ic!en-
tity. 
Any implementation can only dispose of a finite subset of rN . The interpretation function 
for a finite model will therefore not be 1-1 . This opens up a number of issues which will have 
to await future research, in particular what is and what is not a "convenient" model for the 
implementation. Since all these models are models of the same domain axiomatization, it is 
irrelevant as far as domain modelling is concerned which model is chosen. It is an interesting 
phenomenon that the choice of this high level of abstraction allows such fundamental implemen-
tation issues to come out as the choice of global database identifiers. 
